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Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance
Pablo Slutzky
This dissertation studies empirical corporate finance problems of regulations and
monitoring. The dissertation is composed of three chapters. First, I study how
firms deal with business regulations that limit their operations. In the first chapter
I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina to show that the ownership structure
of a firm affects its degree of compliance with regulations, with publicly listed firms
complying more than privately held ones. In 2012 the Argentine government banned
companies from transferring funds abroad from their domestic operations. Despite
this limitation, companies trying to repatriate capital could still overprice products
they import from their headquarters or affiliates. I find that after the regulation,
private firms overprice imports by almost 10% and manage to repatriate up to 46% of
the profits that would have otherwise remained locked in at the Argentine subsidiary.
Listed companies do not exploit this mechanism, showing that listing status affects
compliance.
The second chapter studies whether the differential cost imposed on listed firms
operating in emerging markets by these higher compliance rates is significant. The
main empirical challenge is that the cost is firm-time-regulation specific, and, for
that reason, it is empirically unfeasible to measure it. I take an alternative route
and show that changes in the levels of market regulations impose compliance costs
of such magnitude that they shape the patterns of M&A transactions. First, I show
that after the regulation studied in Chapter 1, private firms acquired listed ones at an
extraordinary pace, while listed firms stopped acquiring private ones. This evidence
suggests that the regulation increased the cost of being public. Then, I show that
this finding is not specific to the Argentine market but is common across emerging
markets. I do so by analyzing the response of M&A transactions to changes in the
regulatory intensity of each country.
Finally, the third chapter, co-authored with Matthieu Chavaz, studies the effect of
deposit insurance on market discipline in a close-to-ideal setting. We exploit the po-
litical relationship between the United Kingdom and its Crown Dependencies and use
a novel dataset to test this effect. Tracking the price paid for thousands of deposit
products between 2007 and 2015, we find that deposit insurance deters discipline.
In addition, we provide the first direct test of the interaction between depositors’
attention, deposit insurance, and market discipline. We show that when attention
increases, risky banks offer higher rates both to insured and uninsured depositors, but
that the effect is stronger for uninsured depositors. These results suggest that disci-
pline is imposed even in the presence of deposit insurance, but only when information
becomes salient.
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Chapter 1
Regulations in Emerging Markets
The Benefits of Being Private
1.1 Introduction
The regulatory environment of a country is a key determinant of its growth poten-
tial.1 Despite their potential role in enhancing business conditions, regulations in
emerging markets are often detrimental to firms. Indeed, on a recent survey of large
global multinational companies,2 executives pointed out regulatory issues as the lead-
ing cause of significant losses in emerging markets, with an average per-company cost
of $1.38 billion dollars over the last five years. While several papers show that inad-
equate regulations limit firms’ performance,3 there is still the question of why firms
are complying with them. In this paper I show that the listing status of firms affects
their decision to comply with regulations, with listed firms complying more than pri-
vately held ones. My analysis uncovers an additional and significant cost faced by
listed firms that operate in emerging markets.
Testing the drivers of compliance is difficult. When firms bypass regulations they
do their best to hide their actions. I overcome this problem by focusing on a spe-
cific event that facilitates a natural mechanism by which firms may circumvent the
1Koedijk and Kremers, 1996, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2004,
Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2005, and Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho, 2006, among others.
2What Companies Do Right (and Wrong) in Emerging Markets, FTI Consulting, July 2015.
3Cincera and Galgau, 2005, Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2010, among others.
1
regulation: a ban on profits repatriation. In 2012 the Argentine government banned
companies from transferring funds abroad from their domestic operations. Despite
this limitation, companies trying to repatriate capital could still overprice products
they import from their headquarters or affiliates. For instance, consider a firm that
pays $10 for a good imported from its headquarters (the transaction price), sells the
good for $15 in the local market (the retail market price) and transfers the $5 in
profits to its headquarters afterwards. Once transfers are banned, the firm could pay
$15 instead of $10 for the same imported good while keeping the retail market price
at $15, thus repatriating the profits hidden in the transaction price. My detailed and
confidential dataset allows me to trace the transaction price for a good before and
after the regulation.
Naturally, a higher post-regulation price is not sufficient evidence of deliberate
overpricing. The transaction price could have gone up in response to inflation in
the country where the good is produced, or to changes in the quality of the good,
among other reasons. To overcome this identification problem, I focus on a specific
industry: the automotive aftermarket.4 This industry has the peculiarity of having
two different types of firms importing exactly the same goods produced by the same
foreign manufacturers: i) affiliates of the manufacturer, and ii) independent distrib-
utors that sell spare parts to end users or auto repair shops. My empirical strategy
exploits this peculiarity and uses a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) setting to compare
the transaction price for affiliates of the manufacturer, and for third parties, before
and after the regulation. The transaction price paid by the third party is used to con-
trol for price changes that respond to reasons other than capital repatriation, since it
is subject to market conditions.5 Thanks to the granularity of the dataset I can trace
and compare transactions that involve a good identified at a very detailed level. For
4This includes parts for replacement or repair of worn or damaged components.
5As Lall, 1973 explains, in transactions between unrelated firms each party tries to maximize its
profits at the expense of the other party.
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instance, a unique good might be an Iveco engine, model 504170202, with a capacity
of 5,880 cm3 and 154 kW of power manufactured by Iveco in Brazil. Exploiting the
richness of the setting and the data, I study whether listed and private firms exploit
the overpricing mechanism to repatriate capital.
I find that after the regulation, private firms overprice imports by almost 10%
and manage to repatriate up to 46% of the profits that would have otherwise re-
mained locked-in in the Argentine subsidiary. Listed companies do not exploit this
mechanism, showing that listing status affects compliance. I test four alternative ex-
planations for the findings to rule out that other characteristics —rather than listing
status— are the drivers of the results. First, since listed firms are usually larger than
private ones, I study listed firms of comparable size to that of private firms in the
sample. I find that size does not drive the results. Second, since listed firms have gen-
erally a more dispersed ownership structure, it could be that this factor is the driver
of the results, since it affects the coordination of illicit actions, differences in political
connectedness, and risk aversion. I study listed firms with concentrated ownership,
and find that they do not overprice imports. This rules out concentrated ownership
as the driver. Third, to rule out visibility as the driver of the results, I categorize
firms into those that are more visible and those that are less visible, and rule out this
characteristic as the driver. Last, since changes in taxes and tariffs can be correlated
with listing status, it could be that these changes affect firms’ opportunities. I control
for these changes and find that they do not alter my results.
One potential concern with my empirical strategy is that listing status could be
endogenous. Anticipating their elusion of a regulation, firms could voluntarily delist
to reduce reporting requirements. In this case, we would find that private firms’ degree
of compliance with regulations is lower than that of listed firms. However, causality
would go in the opposite direction. In my analysis this situation is unlikely, since
the kind of firm I study is the global Multinational Company (MNC) that operates
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in Argentina. Such firms would hardly change their listing status in response to a
regulation in the Argentine market, since it constitutes only 0.87% of the global GDP.
My methodology is free from a number of limitations of papers in the literature.
Some papers use analysts’ assessments of compliance,6 limiting the analysis to pub-
licly listed companies and potentially suffering from subjectivity. Other papers use
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) based measures of firms’ tax evasion,7 but since au-
dits are not random, sample selection bias could affect the results. I use an objective
measure of compliance (the overpricing of imported goods) and analyze all the import
transactions made by both listed and private firms in a specific industry.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the
literature on the costs of being public. Companies that go public incur significant
one-time direct costs, such as underwriting and lawyers fees, as well as recurring
costs, such as auditing, reporting, and stock exchange fees (Ritter, 1987 and Lee
et al., 1996). In addition, they face new compliance costs, such as those associated
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2007). My paper uncovers
another cost: the additional cost of compliance with regulations that are not specific
to listed firms. When confronted with a regulation that limits operations, private
firms manage to reduce the burden imposed on them, while listed firms shoulder the
full-burden cost.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on the economics of crime that
started with the seminal papers by Becker, 1968 and Allingham and Sandmo, 1972.
In the last decade literature on the determinants of corporate illegal behavior has
re-emerged; some link firms’ characteristics with measures of compliance and gov-
ernance in EM, while others estimate the firm value created by bribery. My study
contains several key differences. First, some papers rely on information reported by
6Papers such as Klapper and Love, 2004 and Durnev and Kim, 2005.
7Papers such as Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005 and DeBacker, Heim, and Tran, 2015.
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the regulating authority (Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005, DeBacker, Heim, and
Tran, 2015). The regulatory authority’s capacity to detect violations is not perfect
and thus might incorporate selection bias. Because I use a dataset that includes all
the import transactions made by all firms in a specific industry, my analysis is not
subject to this selection bias. Second, some papers rely on subjective measures of
compliance based on analysts’ opinions (Klapper and Love, 2004, Durnev and Kim,
2005). I overcome the subjectivity problem by using the overpricing of imported
goods as my measure of compliance. Third, some papers use stock market prices or
analysts’ opinions as key inputs (Dyck and Zingales, 2004, Klapper and Love, 2004,
Durnev and Kim, 2005, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2014, and Zeume, 2016), restrict-
ing their analysis to listed firms. By including all the firms (listed and private) within
an industry, I can study the role of ownership structure in illicit behavior.
In summary, my paper makes two contributions. First, it uncovers an additional
cost faced by listed companies that operate in EM: the differential cost of compliance
with regulations that target all firms. Second, it overcomes objectivity, data limita-
tion, and sample selection problems and shows that the ownership structure of a firm
impacts its decision on whether to comply or bypass regulations, with listed firms
complying more than private ones.
1.2 Testing Compliance Rates across Firms
The task of measuring compliance rates is difficult by nature. Firms do not report
when they bypass regulations; therefore data is not readily available. One exception
is the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank
to collect information from firms on the state of the non-governmental sector across
countries. This survey includes questions related to compliance and corruption, such
as whether it is common for firms to make additional payments to do business, or
5
what the percentage is of activity that is kept “off the books”. However, this survey
does not include information on the listing status of the respondents’ firms. While
other papers try to overcome this problem by using analysts’ opinions, rankings, or
audits data, they suffer from subjectivity, are limited to listed firms only, or can be
affected by sample selection bias. To overcome these difficulties, I use a confidential
and novel dataset on international trade, and take advantage of a regulation imposed
by the Argentine government in 2012 that banned companies from transferring money
abroad from their Argentine operations. This setting provides an ideal natural ex-
periment to test compliance rates, since it opens a mechanism by which firms can
bypass the regulation: the overpricing of imports.
1.2.1 The Institutional Setting
In 2011, several macroeconomic conditions combined to cause a sharp decline in
international reserves at the Central Bank of Argentina (see Figure 1.3). A group
of factors affected the flow of funds to and from Argentina, including the drop in
international soy prices, the depreciation of the Brazilian Real (which reduced the
demand for Argentine goods in the Brazilian market), and the specter of inflation. To
stop the increasing outflow of capital, the Argentine government initiated a capital
controls program to limit foreign currency exchange. In October 2011 it launched the
Exchange Transactions Consultation Program (Programa de Consulta de Operaciones
Cambiarias) under Rule A5239. According to this measure, individuals who wanted to
exchange currency had to complete a request, and the government, through the fiscal
authority AFIP (its Spanish acronym), would then approve or reject the request. The
decision was to be based on income, credit card balances, rent expenses, and other
personal factors. This market restriction spawned the creation of a black market for
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US dollars, in which the foreign currency was traded at a significant premium,8 as
illustrated in Figure 1.4.
In November 2011, the measures were expanded to include companies’ transfers.
If the amount to be transferred exceeded USD 500,000, the company had to ask for
authorization from the Central Bank. However, no request has ever been authorized
by the Central Bank. In practice, companies were transferring amounts slightly un-
der the threshold each day (e.g. USD 490.000) until they reached the total amount
desired. In February 2012, these measures were tightened with Rule A5264. Com-
panies were now banned from exchanging currency to transfer royalties and earnings
abroad. Furthermore, a transfer of any amount required the Central Bank’s autho-
rization, and was seldom granted.9 Figure 1.5 plots the amount of royalties and
earnings that were transferred abroad between 2008 and 2012, and shows that after
Rule A5264 the transfers declined by more than 94%.
The aforementioned regulation opens a natural mechanism whereby firms may
circumvent the regulation. Several studies argue that firms use international trade as
a mechanism to export capital. As explained by Lall, 1973, when the remittance of
royalties and profits are controlled, the overpricing (or transfer mispricing) mechanism
provides an alternative channel for repatriation of capital. Through the purchase of
overpriced goods, the buyer transfers funds to the seller. The mechanism exploited
by firms to export capital10 can be better understood with an example.11 Suppose
that firm XYZ is a MNC headquartered in the US with subsidiaries in Argentina and
Mexico. Before the introduction of the regulation, the Argentine subsidiary could
import goods from the Mexican subsidiary for $10 (1a and 1b), sell them in the local
8The premium paid for foreign currency in the black market was on average 25% in 2012 and
60% in 2013, and peaked at 100% in May 2013.
9www.ambito.com/diario/noticia.asp?id=623531.
10A more comprehensive list of forms of mispricing can be found in Appendix A.
11The example provided ignores tax effects for simplicity.
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market for $15 (2a and 2b), and transfer the profit of $5 to the headquarters (3), as
shown in Figure 1.1.
Facing the ban on international transfers, companies might partake in transfer
mispricing, a practice that takes the form illustrated in Figure 1.2. In this example
the Argentine subsidiary pays a higher price for the imported good to the Mexican
subsidiary (1a and 1b), makes no profit in Argentina when selling the product at
the same price it was being sold before (2a and 2b), and the profit is transferred
from the Mexican subsidiary to the headquarters, thereby bypassing the effects of the
regulation. However, higher post-regulation transfer prices are not sufficient evidence
to claim that the company is overpricing goods in order to export capital. Prices
might have gone up for reasons other than capital repatriation, such as inflation in
Mexico, or changes in the quality of the product, among others.
To rule out alternative explanations, I use a DiD setting that compares the price
paid for a good by a branch or affiliate of the manufacturer with the price paid for
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̸
exactly the same good by a company unrelated to the exporter, before and after
the regulation. I use the price paid by the non-related company as a proxy for the
market price, to absorb changes in price related to factors such as inflation in the
exporter country. The granularity of the dataset allows me to trace an exact good
imported across time and by different parties. For instance, I can trace imports of
an Iveco engine model 504170202 with a capacity of 5,880 cm3 and 154 kW of power
manufactured by Iveco in Brazil, and compare the price paid by Iveco Argentina with
the price paid by an independent distributor, before and after the regulation.
While the study of the transfer mispricing mechanism is not new, my analysis
differs from the existing literature in several ways. First and most important, my
paper is the first to cite the ownership structure of firms as a key determinant affecting
the use of this mechanism. Second, I compare the price paid by related and non-
related parties for the exact same good, unlike Lall, 1973 who studies the use of
this mechanism in Colombia and relies on experts’ assessment of the value of the
9
imported goods to proxy for the market price. Third, unlike Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott, 2006 who study intra- and extra-firm import prices for firms operating in the
U.S. and compare prices paid for products belonging to the same category, thanks to
the detail in my data I can compare the price paid for the exact same good. 12
1.2.2 Data and Methodology
1.2.2.1 Data
I use two datasets for this section. The first dataset is a novel and confidential
Argentine customs database. Compared to datasets used in previous studies (e.g. the
U.S. merchandise trade database), this database offers key advantages. In addition
to the information frequently available in customs databases used by researchers, the
one used in the present study provides information identifying the importer (name
and taxpayer ID) and product detail —brand, model, and country of manufacture—
beyond what is provided by the Harmonized Code. This level of detail allows me
to compare the price paid for exactly the same product being imported by different
firms at different points in time. The dataset includes imports that occurred between
January 2010 and September 2014, spanning two years before the regulation, and
two-and-a-half years after it.
I analyze transactions belonging to the harmonized system codes 84.07, 84.08,
and 84.09,13 categories chosen for a key reason. Products in these categories are
12Several papers identify products by their 10-digit harmonized system code, a coding system
that classifies traded products. However, even when using the maximum level of detail the system
provides, the comparison of products is not precise. For instance, the 10-digit category 8407.33.10.30
includes “Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines, of a cylinder
capacity exceeding 250 cc but not exceeding 1,000 cc, to be installed in tractors suitable for agricul-
tural use, not exceeding 37.3 kW”. However, products within this category are hardly comparable.
An engine with a capacity of 500 cc and 5kW will not have the same price as one with a capacity of
1,000 cc and 37kW, even though they are grouped under the same 10-digit harmonized code.
13These codes reference spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines,
compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines), and parts
suitable for use solely or principally with the engines of heading 84.07 or 84.08, respectively. Products
in these categories account for approximately 2.5% of total Argentine imports.
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engine components for the automotive aftermarket (i.e., involving solely replacement
or repair). Products in this industry present a peculiarity: they are imported by two
different types of firms: affiliates of the manufacturer, and independent distributors
that sell spare parts to end users or auto repair shops. This characteristic allows me to
compare the price paid for exactly the same product being imported by two different
firms, one related and one non-related to the manufacturer. Therefore, the price paid
by the non-related party can be used as a proper control, since it incorporates price
changes that occur for reasons other than profit repatriation.
The cleaning process is described next. I keep observations that include complete
information on the importer, brand, and model of the product. This is required in
order to match the importer with an exporter, determine if the two firms are re-
lated, and trace each specific product imported by different parties over time. Then,
I remove observations where the importer is not a frequent importer,14 as prices for
non-frequent importers might be noisy and affect the results. I also drop transactions
denominated in Argentine Pesos (less than 2% of the observations) which might have
been set based on an exchange rate other than the official exchange rate and are not
comparable to prices set in USD. The final sample includes almost 850,000 import
transactions and 73 importers, 37 of which are subsidiaries of MNC, and 36 of which
are independent domestic companies. Among the MNC, 23 are listed companies and
14 are private companies; all are incorporated in countries that belong to the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Altogether, these
firms import products from 88 different countries.
The second dataset is the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Global Brand Database,15 which includes information on registered trademarks. Since
the imports dataset does not include information on the identity of the exporter, I
14A non-frequent importer is defined as an importer with less than one thousand products im-
ported in the period 2010-2014.
15Available at http://www.wipo.int.
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match each imported product with its manufacturer by looking at the firm that owns
the trademark in the country from which the product is being exported.16 For in-
stance, if I observe a product “Veglia Borletti” being imported from Indonesia, I
search for the trademark and find that the owner of that brand in that country is the
company Magneti Marelli S.p.A..
The next step is to determine whether the firm importing the goods in Argentina
and the exporter for each transaction are related. To that end, I manually search
for information on each firm, determine whether it is a multinational company, and
determine who the parent company is. As an example, by looking at Magneti Marelli
S.p.A. I find that the company’s parent organization is Fiat S.p.A. Next, I look at
each transaction, determine whether the importer and the exporter are branches or
affiliates under the control of the same parent firm, and create an indicator for related
firms. For instance, if the importer of the Veglia Borletti product is Fiat Argentina,
I flag the transaction as between related parties, since Fiat Argentina (importer) and
Magneti Marelli (exporter) belong to the same parent company. Lastly, I manually
search for information on the ownership structure of the parent company, with respect
to whether it is listed or private. In this case, I find that at the time of the transaction,
Fiat S.p.A. (or Fiat Industrial S.p.A.) was listed on the Milan stock exchange.
1.2.2.2 Methodology
I exploit a regulation imposed by the Argentine government in 2012 banning com-
panies from transferring funds from Argentine operations abroad as a source of ex-
ogenous variation, and I use firms’ ownership structure as a source of cross-sectional
variation. Companies trying to repatriate capital despite the regulation could over-
price products imported from their headquarters or affiliates. However, higher post-
16It could be argued that the firm producing the good might not be the firm exporting it. However,
for the present study it is sufficient to know that there is a relationship between the importer and
the producer. The presence of an intermediary does not affect the potential use of the transfer
mispricing mechanism.
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regulation prices could be caused by reasons other than capital repatriation, such as
inflation or changes in the quality of the product. Therefore, a simple comparison of
prices before and after the regulation is not sufficient.
I focus on a specific industry: the automotive aftermarket.17 This industry has
a characteristic that is key to overcoming the problem mentioned before. In this
industry, two types of firms import exactly the same goods, produced by the same
foreign manufacturer in the same country: i) affiliates of the manufacturer, and ii)
independent distributors that sell spare parts to end users or auto repair shops. I
exploit this peculiarity and use a DiD setting to compare the price paid for a product
by a related importer with the price paid by a non-related importer, before and after
the regulation.
A DiD setting requires a subset of the units under study to be subject to a
treatment, while the other subset is used as control. Since in my setting every firm
is subject to the same treatment (i.e. the ban on international transfers) the usual
definition of treated and control firms cannot be applied. However, the context allows
for an interesting definition of treated and control firms. In this setting, a treated unit
is one that imports products from its headquarters or an affiliate manufacturer.18
Meanwhile, a control unit is one that imports products from a non-related party.
Comparing the price paid by a related party with the one paid by a non-related party
allows me to isolate the effect that factors other than capital repatriation motives
might have on the price of a product. Since the price paid by a non-related party is
subject to market conditions, it includes all those potential factors. The extraordinary
granularity of the dataset allows me to trace a product identified with extreme detail
and compare the price paid for exactly the same good imported by two different
parties at different points in time.
17Parts for replacement or repair of worn or damaged components.
18One that belongs to the same MNC.
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In addition to the two standard dimensions used in a DiD setting —treated and
post— I exploit a third source of variation: treated firms’ listing status. The literature
on the economics of crime has shown that a key driver of the decision to evade a norm
is the probability of being detected. Since listed firms are subject to stricter scrutiny
than private firms, the conditional probability of their being detected is greater. Thus,
I exploit the listing status of the MNC’s parent company as the cross sectional source
of variation for testing whether private and listed firms behave differently. To this
end, I divide the treated group —which imports goods from related parties— into
two different subgroups: (1) subsidiaries of MNCs whose parent companies are listed,
and (2) subsidiaries of MNCs whose parent companies are private.
Analyzing MNCs serves two purposes. First, MNCs fulfill the role of a necessary
condition, since these firms can easily exploit the transfer mispricing mechanism.
Firms with no affiliates need a third party to act as an accomplice and pay the
difference between the market price and the paid price in a foreign account, without
leaving a record. Second, analyzing MNCs imparts exogeneity to the listing status
of firms, since a MNC would hardly change its global listing status in response to a
regulation in Argentina.
The main regression specification used in this section is:
Pijkt = αi + αm + βp × Post+ βr ×Relatedjk + βpr × Post×Relatedjk + ϵijkt (1.1)
where i represents the imported good, j indicates the importer, k indicates the ex-
porter, m indicates month, and t indicates time. The variable under study is the price
paid for the good i being imported by firm j and exported by firm k at time t. To
keep the study uncontaminated by changes in other costs such as insurance, freight,
and shipping costs, I use the Free on Board (FOB) price, the price of the good ready
to be shipped at the origin port. The exporter pays for transportation of the goods to
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the port of shipment, plus loading costs. In addition, the import price is normalized
by the mean price of that product in order to provide equal consideration to prod-
ucts at different price levels. The specification includes product (αi) and month (αm)
fixed effects. Product fixed effects control for all time-invariant characteristics of the
product and for all time-invariant characteristics of the exporter, since each product
is manufactured by only one company. Month fixed effects control for seasonality.
The standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter pair level.19
According to previous studies, we should expect the coefficient βr to be negative.
This coefficient is related to the price wedge in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006,
where the authors show that U.S. exporters set lower prices for related importers
than for arm’s-length importers.20 The coefficient βp indicates the price change for
products after the regulation. If demand for imported products is reduced, we might
expect a negative coefficient to increase sales. However, if exporters expect delays
in liquidation of international payments, they might increase prices to account for a
longer financing period. Therefore, the sign of this coefficient cannot be predicted.
The coefficient of interest is βpr, which indicates whether the price increase after
the regulation for a related importer was different than that for a non-related im-
porter. If companies start paying a higher price for products imported from related
parties to export capital, we should expect βpr to be positive. The magnitude of
the coefficient is a priori unknown and should respond to a trade-off. On the one
hand, higher price manipulation allows a company to export a higher fraction of the
profits that cannot be exported anymore via an international transfer. On the other
hand, the higher the manipulation the higher the probability of being detected by
the regulator.
19To facilitate interpretation, I present the results in a DiD setting, splitting the sample between
listed and private firms. However, it must be noted that the results using a triple differences setting
are similar to the ones presented here.
20Potential explanations given by the authors include longer-term contracts, managerial incen-
tives, and tax reasons.
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For the results to be meaningful, we have to assume that the parallel trends
assumption holds. In the present context, it implies that in the absence of the rule
limiting international transfers, the prices for related and non-related parties would
follow the same pattern observed prior to Rule A5264. In support of the parallel
trends assumption, in Figure 1.6 I plot the deviation from the demeaned price for
goods imported by both firms related and non-related to the exporter. In addition,
I include the series for private related importers only. Before the regulation the
prices for related and non-related importers move together and the price for a related
importer is lower than the price for a non-related importer, which is consistent with
prior findings in the literature. At the time of the regulation the patterns for related
importers seem to change, but they do not exhibit a clear pattern consistent with
imports overpricing. However, when I analyze the series for private related importers
only, the pattern is striking. At the time of the regulation, prices for private related
importers increase significantly, while prices for non-related importers decrease. This
evidence suggests that private firms overprice imports to export capital.
An alternative explanation for the pricing patterns would be significant changes
in the volumes imported, since they might affect bargaining power or discounts given
by exporters. Figure 1.7 plots the aggregate volume of imports by domestic, listed,
and private MNCs for these products. Subfigure (A) shows total imports from all
types of exporters, while subfigure (B) shows only imports from related exporters.
Both figures show stable patterns, suggesting that volumes cannot explain the pricing
patterns observed.
As for control variables, we might control for time-varying characteristics of the
firms. Unfortunately, information on the Argentine operations of firms is protected
by national fiscal secrecy rules. As for global private MNCs, they do not disclose
financial statements. In contrast, global listed MNCs disclose their financial state-
ments, however the statements are consolidated, and don’t allow for the isolation
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and study of Argentine subsidiaries’ operations. For this reason, several robustness
tests are conducted to rule out alternative explanations such as differences in size,
concentration of ownership, or visibility. 21
1.2.3 Results
I first show that private MNCs have a lower compliance rate than listed MNCs,
participate in transfer mispricing, and export a significant fraction of the profits
via this mechanism. Then I present several robustness tests to rule out alternative
explanations.
The results of regression specification 1.1 are presented in Table 1.1, where the
sample is split between transactions made by private MNCs (columns [1] and [2])
and listed MNCs (columns [3] and [4]). In both cases, transactions made by domestic
firms are included as controls.22 The coefficient on Related shows that exporters
set a lower price for related importers, which is consistent with findings in Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott, 2006. The difference calculated in column [5] shows that this
practice does not differ between listed and private firms. More importantly, the
results provided in the first column of Table 1.1 show that after the regulation, the
price increase for a product imported by a related company is 9.96% higher than
that for a non-related company if the related importer is a private company. These
results are significant at the 1% level. In column [2] the specification includes month
fixed effects to control for potential seasonality issues, and the results are not altered.
The evidence suggests that private companies are manipulating transfer prices to
export capital. Results in columns [3] and [4] measure price increases for listed
firms relative to that of non-related importers. The differential price increase is
21In additional tests not presented here, I include firm fixed effects and results do not change
with respect to those found with product fixed effects. It must be noted that firm and product fixed
effects cannot be included in the same specification because there would not be enough variation to
estimate the regression coefficients.
22Approximately 360,000 transactions.
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indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that listed firms do not exploit the transfer
mispricing mechanism. The difference in the price increase between private and listed
MNCs relative to the difference in price increase for non-related importers is shown
in column [5]. The difference between the two coefficients for Post x Related is
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the differences in the individual coefficients
for Post and Related are not significant at the 10% level.
To understand the magnitude of the coefficient βpr, I do a back-of-the-envelope
calculation using information obtained from one of the companies in the sample.
Before the regulation, this firm had a ratio of Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) to Sales
of 84% and a ratio of Selling, General and Administrative Expenses to Sales of 9.5%.
Ignoring taxes for the sake of simplicity, this firm would have a Net Income to Sales
ratio of 6.5%. Lacking further information and proceeding conservatively, I assume
the FOB price of the imported goods to be 30% of sales, with the balance of 54%
corresponding to assembling, shipping, packaging, and other costs. For a company
with these characteristics, the 10% overprice of imports would represent a transfer of
46% of the profits earned, since 10% of a cost that amounts to 30% of sales represents












Listed firms are, in general, larger than private ones, and larger firms might get more
attention from regulators than smaller ones. Thus, it could be argued that it is size
—and not listing status— that affects firms’ compliance with business-unfriendly
regulations. To test this theory, I construct a subsample of listed firms that are
comparable in size to private firms and repeat the analysis for this subset of firms.23
The results in Table 1.2 show that listed firms that are comparable to private firms
do not overprice imports in order to export capital. This result suggests that size
does not affect behavior regarding the ban on profits repatriation.
1.2.4.2 Concentrated Ownership
It might also be argued that listed firms in general have a more dispersed ownership
structure, and that this characteristic might influence political connectedness, risk
aversion, or the ability to coordinate actions. To rule out this alternative explanation,
I split listed firms into those that have a shareholder with 10% or more of the shares24
and those that don’t. I repeat the study for the subset of firms that have concentrated
ownership to test whether this is the factor driving non-compliance. The results
in Table 1.3 suggest that listed firms with concentrated ownership do not exploit
the overpricing mechanism. These results rule out the alternative explanation that
ownership concentration drives the findings.
23Since unconsolidated data on the size of the Argentine operations for each firm is not available,
I proxy it with the total volume of dollar imports before the regulation.
24Taking after La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999.
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1.2.4.3 Visibility
In addition to being larger and having more dispersed ownership, listed firms are
usually more visible than private firms. Therefore, it might be that the more visible
firms comply more with regulations. To test whether visibility drives compliance, I
construct a measure of visibility using the Factiva dataset to determine the number of
news items that mention each company in 2011,25 and repeat the test splitting firms
into those that are more visible (visibility level above the median), and those that
are less visible (visibility level below the median). Since, for this test, I do not need
financial data such as size or ownership concentration,26 I can use the universe of
firms in my database and split them into those that are more visible and less visible,
regardless of their listing status. The results in Table 1.4 show that visibility is not
a factor that drives compliance.
1.2.4.4 Corporate Taxes and Tariffs Minimization Strategy
The DiD setting is ideal for controlling for shocks that affect all firms. However, there
are also shocks that affect some firms and not others, such as changes in exporting
countries’ tax rates, or changes in tariffs. Consider a case in which the corporate
tax rate in Brazil decreases. Since transfer prices can also be used to shift profits
from one subsidiary to another, firms that import goods from their affiliates in Brazil
would have incentives to increase transfer prices and reduce the overall amount of tax
the company pays. If only private MNCs imported goods from Brazil, listed MNCs
would not be able to exploit this mechanism even if they wanted to. If listing status
is correlated with changes in tax rates or tariffs, my findings could be responding to
the possibility rather than intentionality of firms’ bypassing regulations.
25I use information on the year before the regulation to avoid potential endogeneity problems.
26This information is not available for private firms, therefore it is not possible to split the entire
sample in terms of characteristics such as size or ownership concentration.
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To rule out this alternative, I control for changes in corporate tax rates for each
country that Argentine firms in my sample are importing from, and for changes in
tariffs, meant to absorb price changes arising from tax minimization strategies. The
results of the specification, including a control for each corporate tax rate change, are
provided in Table 1.5 and show that the differential price increase does not correspond
with tax minimization strategies.
1.2.4.5 Other Avenues
Overpricing imports is one of several mechanisms that firms might use to export
capital, in spite of the regulation. Firms can also overpay for services at their head-
quarters, or inflate the interest on intra-firm loans. Even though firm-level data is not
available, a close look at aggregated data seems to suggest that firms do not exploit
these avenues. Figure 1.8 plots the transfers abroad made by firms in Argentina with
regard to: i) payment for services27 and ii) interest payments.
Payment for services does not increase after the regulation, suggesting that firms
did not use this avenue to export capital. In contrast, interest payments do increase
after the regulation. However, this increase can be explained by an increase in the
credit risk spread of Argentina, as measured by J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets
Bond Index (EMBI+) for Argentina.
Although other avenues might be available, the fact that listed firms do not over-
price imports —a mechanism that is readily available to them— and do not seem
to use other mechanisms that are easy to implement, suggests that it is costlier for
listed firms to bypass regulations.
27This category includes professional and technical services, insurance, communication services,
IT services, IP and trademark, and copyright.
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1.3 Conclusion
Emerging markets provide business opportunities for firms. These markets are gener-
ally less mature, presenting highly profitable opportunities. However, it might seem
that in emerging markets change is the only constant with regard to business condi-
tions. Governments in these markets often change their rules and regulations, and
firms have a decision to make: whether to comply, or whether to find mechanisms to
bypass those regulations.
In this paper I show that the listing status of a firm affects its compliance rate
with regulations, specifically with listed firms complying more than private ones. In
addition, I show that private firms can significantly mitigate the regulatory burden
presented to them. Thus, this paper uncovers an additional cost faced by listed
firms operating in emerging markets: the differential compliance cost associated with
regulations that target all firms. Listed firms are subject to stricter monitoring,
therefore they cannot bypass regulations nor reduce the burden these regulations
impose on them, whereas private firms can, and do.
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1.4 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.3: Stock of International Reserves at the Argentine Central Bank
This Figure reports the level of international reserves at the central bank of Argentina,
including foreign currency, gold, and term deposits. By the end of 2011, several
macroeconomic conditions combined to cause a sharp decline in international reserves.
A group of factors affected the flow of funds to and from Argentina, including the
drop in international soy prices, the depreciation of the Brazilian Real (which reduced
the demand for Argentine goods in the Brazilian market), and the specter of inflation.
Source: Argentine Central Bank.
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Figure 1.4: Official and Black Market Exchange Rates: ARS per USD
This Figure shows the evolution of both the official and the black market
exchange rates for the Argentine peso with respect to the US dollar. Af-
ter the Argentine government imposed restrictions on the exchange of for-
eign currency, the spread between both rates increased sharply. Source:
La Nación Newspaper (http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1798393-el-dolar-blue-y-su-
evolucion-en-los-ultimos-anos
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Figure 1.5: Transfer of Earnings and Royalties
This Figure graphs the amount of US dollars that companies were repatriating from
Argentina to their headquarters. In 2011, before the ban on international transfers,
companies were transferring approximately 4.5 billion US dollars per year. After
the ban, the amount transferred decreased by more than 94%. The vertical line
demarcates the pre and post periods. Source: Argentine Central Bank.
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Figure 1.6: Price paid by related and non-related importers, before and after the
regulation
This Figure plots the deviation from the demeaned price for products imported by
both private-related and non-related importers. Before the regulation, private-related
importers paid lower prices than non-related importers. At the time of the regula-
tion, prices for private-related importers increased significantly compared to prices for
non-related importers, suggesting that companies were overpricing imports to export
capital. The vertical line demarcates the pre and post periods.
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Figure 1.7: Volume of Imports
(A) From all exporters
(B) From related exporters
This Figure plots the total volume of imports (taken from a log of FOB prices) made
by firms in my sample. Figure (A) includes products imported from all types of
exporters. Figure (B) includes only products imported from related exporters. The
vertical line demarcates the pre and post periods. This evidence suggests that the
volumes imported did not change significantly after the regulation and were similar
for both listed and private firms.
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Figure 1.8: Alternative Channels
(A) Payment for Services
(B) Interest Payments
These graphs plot transfers abroad made by firms in Argentina, with regard to:
payment for services (Figure (A)) and interest payments (Figure (B)). The graph
shows that after the regulation, payment for services did not increase, suggesting that
firms did not use this avenue to repatriate capital. In contrast, interest payments did
increase after the regulation. However, the increase seems to correspond with higher
interest rates, as reflected by the increase in the credit spread as measured by J.P.
Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) for Argentina. The vertical line
demarcates the pre and post periods. Source: Argentine Central Bank and Ambito
Financiero Newspaper.
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Table 1.1: Transfer Mispricing Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price Private firms Listed firms Difference (1) - (3)
Post 0.00376 0.00172 0.00861 0.00810 -0.00485
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Related -0.0530*** -0.0548*** -0.0889** -0.0892** 0.0359
(0.018) (0.017) (0.039) (0.039)
Post × Related 0.0996*** 0.0990*** 0.0134 0.0133 0.0862***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.018)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
N 430,846 430,846 787,591 787,591
This table presents the import prices in a DiD setting. The sample consists of im-
ported goods belonging to Harmonized System codes 84.07 (Spark-ignition recipro-
cating or rotary internal combustion piston engines), 84.08 (Compression-ignition
internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)) and 84.09 (Parts
suitable for use solely or principally with the engines of heading 84.07 or 84.08) and
represent the period between January 2010 and September 2014. The dependent
variable is the import price normalized by the mean price of that product, which is
done in order to give equal consideration to products at different price levels. Post is
a dummy indicator for import transactions that occurred after Rule A5264. Relatedjk
is a dummy indicator for transactions between importers and exporters that belong
to the same MNC. The results in columns [1] and [2] measure the differential price
increase for private firms, using the price paid by unrelated domestic firms as a con-
trol. The results in columns [3] and [4] measure the same differential price increase
for listed firms. Column [5] shows the difference in the coefficients obtained from
Columns [1] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter pair level
and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.2: Transfer Mispricing Mechanism - Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price Private firms “Small” Listed Firms Difference (1) - (3)
Post 0.00376 0.00172 0.00860 0.00769 -0.00484
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Related -0.0530*** -0.0548*** -0.122** -0.122** 0.069
(0.018) (0.017) (0.061) (0.061)
Post × Related 0.0996*** 0.0990*** 0.0125 0.0122 0.0871**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
N 430,846 430,846 686,319 686,319
This table presents the import prices in a DiD setting and compares the behavior of
private firms with that of listed firms of comparable size. The dependent variable is
the import price normalized by the mean price of that product, which is done in order
to give equal consideration to products at different price levels. Post is a dummy
indicator for import transactions that occurred after Rule A5264. Relatedjk is a
dummy indicator for transactions between importers and exporters that belong to the
same MNC. The results in columns [1] and [2] measure the differential price increase
for private firms, using the price paid by unrelated domestic firms as a control. The
results in columns [3] and [4] measure the same differential price increase for listed
firms comparable in size to private firms. Column [5] shows the difference in the
coefficients obtained from Columns [1] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered at the
importer-exporter pair level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Transfer Mispricing Mechanism - Concentrated Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price Private firms Listed Firms w/Concentrated Ownership Difference (1) - (3)
Post 0.00376 0.00172 -0.00538 -0.00634 0.00914
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Related -0.0530*** -0.0548*** -0.109** -0.109** 0.056
(0.018) (0.017) (0.052) (0.052)
Post × Related 0.0996*** 0.0990*** 0.0292 0.0292 0.0704***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.021)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
N 430,846 430,846 693,535 693,535
This table presents the import prices in a DiD setting and compares the behavior of
private firms with that of listed firms with concentrated ownership. The dependent
variable is the import price normalized by the mean price of that product, which
is done in order to give equal consideration to products at different price levels.
Post is a dummy indicator for import transactions that occurred after Rule A5264.
Relatedjk is a dummy indicator for transactions between importers and exporters that
belong to the same MNC. The results in columns [1] and [2] measure the differential
price increase for private firms, using the price paid by unrelated domestic firms as
a control. The results in columns [3] and [4] measure the same differential price
increase for listed firms with a concentrated ownership structure, defined as having
a shareholder that owns at least 10% of the shares. Column [5] shows the difference
in the coefficients obtained from Columns [1] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered
at the importer-exporter pair level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Transfer Mispricing Mechanism - Visibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price Low visibility High visibility Difference (1) - (3)
Post 0.0145 0.0134 -0.00419 -0.00521 0.01869
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Related -0.0895* -0.0917** -0.0510* -0.0510* -0.0385
(0.046) (0.046) (0.026) (0.026)
Post × Related 0.0316 0.0315 0.0266 0.0266 0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
N 543,110 543,110 680,689 680,689
This table presents the import prices in a DiD setting and compares the behavior of
firms that are less visible with that of firms that are more visible. The dependent
variable is the import price normalized by the mean price of that product, which is
done in order to give equal consideration to products at different price levels. Post is
a dummy indicator for import transactions that occurred after Rule A5264. Relatedjk
is a dummy indicator for transactions between importers and exporters that belong
to the same MNC. The results in columns [1] and [2] measure the differential price
increase for less visible multinational firms, using the price paid by unrelated domestic
firms as a control. The results in columns [3] and [4] measure the same differential
price increase for more visible multinational firms. Column [5] shows the difference
in the coefficients obtained from Columns [1] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered
at the importer-exporter pair level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Transfer Mispricing Mechanism - Tax and Tariff Minimization Strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price Private firms Listed firms Difference (1) - (3)
Post 0.00377 0.00171 0.00864 0.00824 -0.00487
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Related -0.0542*** -0.0563*** -0.0933** -0.0933** 0.0391
(0.018) (0.018) (0.039) (0.039)
Post × Related 0.0956*** 0.0941*** 0.0199 0.0190 0.0757***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No Yes No Yes
Corporate Taxes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 430,846 430,846 787,591 787,591
This table presents the import prices in a DiD setting and includes controls for changes
in corporate taxes in countries where firms are importing from. The dependent vari-
able is the import price normalized by the mean price of that product, which is done
in order to give equal consideration to products at different price levels. Post is a
dummy indicator for import transactions that occurred after Rule A5264. Relatedjk
is a dummy indicator for transactions between importers and exporters that belong to
the same MNC. Columns [1] and [2] measure the differential price increase for private
firms, using the price paid by unrelated domestic firms as a control. Columns [3] and
[4] measure the same differential price increase for listed firms. Standard errors are
clustered at the importer-exporter pair level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Regulatory Environment and M&A in Emerging Markets
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies whether the differential cost imposed to listed firms operating
in EM by higher compliance rates is significant. Chapter 1 shows that these firms
have less flexibility than private firms when dealing with regulations in EM, which
translates into a higher compliance cost. A natural question that follows is whether
the differential cost is large in magnitude. The main empirical challenge is that the
cost is firm-time-regulation specific, and for that reason it is empirically unfeasible to
measure. I take an alternative route and show that changes in the levels of market
regulations impose compliance costs of such magnitude that they shape the patterns
of M&A transactions.
I start by analyzing the Argentine M&A market. I show that after the regulation
studied in Chapter 1, private firms acquired listed ones at an extraordinary pace, while
listed firms stopped acquiring private ones. This suggests that regulation increases
the cost of being public. To further test whether this pattern was a response to the
regulation under study, I construct a measure of industry exposure to the regulation,
denoting the percentage of earnings that each industry was repatriating before the
regulation. I find that global listed firms in industries more exposed to the regulations
often sold their Argentine operations in the aftermath of the ban, while private global
firms in the same industries did not. This suggests that sale patterns responded to the
regulation under study and to the differential compliance costs that listed firms faced.
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It also suggests that compliance costs can be large enough to trigger the divestiture
of subsidiaries.
I then show that this finding is not specific to the Argentine market but is common
across EM, by analyzing the response of M&A transactions in EM to changes in the
regulatory intensity of each country. When a market becomes business-unfriendly
we should expect private firms to acquire listed ones, since the former can reduce
the regulatory burden and increase the value of a listed firm. In contrast, when the
market becomes less regulated, the benefit of being public should outweigh the effect
of the now lower compliance cost, and we should expect listed firms to acquire private
ones.1 To measure the level of regulation in each country, I use the index of Economic
Freedom developed by Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 2015. The index “measures the
degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic
freedom”. For each country-year, the report provides five different measures of eco-
nomic freedom2 and then combines them to provide an overall index. This index is
close to my notion of an unregulated market: one in which free competition is the
rule.3 I analyze patterns in M&A transactions in 59 EM in response to changes in
the regulatory environment between 2001 and 2014. Like Alesina and Dollar, 2000, I
construct regulatory and deregulatory “episodes”,4 and show that after a regulatory
1It could be argued that a firm could voluntarily delist or go public in response to changes in the
regulatory environment. However, it is unlikely that a global firm would change its listing status in
response to regulations in one of the emerging markets where it operates, especially because these
markets usually represent a small fraction of the company’s operations.
2Size of Government, Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Access to Sound Money,
Freedom to Trade Internationally, and Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.
3Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 2015 state that “In order to receive a high Economic Freedom
of the World rating, a country must provide secure protection of privately owned property, even-
handed enforcement of contracts, and a stable monetary environment. It also must keep taxes low,
refrain from creating barriers to both domestic and international trade, and rely more fully on
markets rather than government spending and regulation to allocate goods and resources. In many
ways, a country’s Economic Freedom of the World summary rating is a measure of how closely its
institutions and policies compare with the idealized structure implied by standard textbook analysis
of microeconomics”.
4An episode indicates a change of at least one standard deviation in the level of Economic
Freedom.
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episode (i.e., increase in regulatory burden) the percentage5 of transactions between
private acquirers and listed targets increases by between 5 and 28 percentage points,
while the percentage of transactions between listed acquirers and private targets de-
creases by between 5 and 14 percentage points. In contrast, after a deregulatory
episode these results are reversed.
To further support my interpretation and to pin down the driver of compliance,
I perform additional tests exploiting several sources of heterogeneity. First, I exploit
differences in the markets where firms are listed. A potential explanation for the
behavior of listed firms is that they are subject to stricter scrutiny, increasing the
conditional probability of being caught bypassing regulations. To test this explana-
tion, I analyze differences in the strictness of the auditing and enforcement standards
that listed firms are subject to. If stricter monitoring drives compliance, the M&A
patterns should be larger and more significant in transactions that involve listed firms
under stricter scrutiny than for those that involve firms under more lenient scrutiny,
even when these firms operate in the same market. Indeed, I find that they are.
Second, and to support the idea that differential cost of compliance drives the re-
sults, I test the effect of changes in the regulatory environment on the percentage of
transactions where private firms acquire other private firms, and on the percentage
of transactions where listed firms acquire other listed firms. I find no effect. In ad-
dition, I analyze M&A transactions of firms operating in Developed Markets (DM).6
Since non-compliers have to perceive a substantial probability of getting away with
bypassing regulations —and in DM, enforcement and scrutiny are stricter even for
private firms— the patterns should not be present when analyzing M&A transactions
of firms operating in those markets. I find that the patterns are absent in DM.
5I use the percentage of transactions of each type over the total number of transactions for that
country-year to control for waves of transactions that might affect the results.
6As opposed to the previous case, where I analyzed firms operating in EM but compared those
listed in EM with those listed in DM.
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I also rule out alternative explanations that might be driving the results. First,
since listed firms generally have a more dispersed ownership than private ones, the
former might be willing to take more risky projects. If the measure of economic
freedom is correlated with measures of risk, it could be that the M&A patterns
respond to differences in risk aversion and not to compliance costs. I repeat the
analysis replacing the economic freedom index with the Political Risk Index developed
by the Political Risk Services Group. The index includes information on 12 risk
factors that address not only political risk but also different kinds of risk associated
with political institutions, such as religious and ethnic tensions. I find no significant
results, thereby ruling out that differences in risk aversion drive the results. Second,
in order to rule out results driven by spurious correlation, I run a placebo test by
randomizing episodes’ dates, and find no results.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the costs of being public. It shows
that that the additional cost of compliance with regulations that are not specific
to listed firms is so large that it shapes M&A patterns. It also contributes to the
literature on determinants of M&A activity. The literature cites several drivers of
M&A transactions, including but not limited to stock market misvaluations (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005), CEO over-
confidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and risk diversification (Thijssen, 2008).
Factors in cross-country M&A include but are not limited to stock market capital-
ization, exchange rate, differences in accounting standards, shareholder protection,
and governance regimes of target and acquirer companies (Rossi and Volpin, 2004,
Di Giovanni, 2005, Rossi and Volpin, 2007, Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2011, and
Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012). Within this literature the closest papers to mine are
Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996 and Harford, 2005, who find that regulatory shocks play
an important role in merger waves, and Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang, 2013, who
analyze the different behaviors and performance of private and listed U.S. firms dur-
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ing merger waves. However, no paper in this literature seems to use the combination
of regulatory shocks with firms’ ownership structure to explain acquisitions.
Lastly, this chapter contributes to the literature on International Capital Flows.
Several papers have looked at the effect that corruption, political risk, and regulations
have on foreign direct investment (Hines, 1995, Wei, 2000a, Wei, 2000b, Smarzynska
and Wei, 2000, Wei and Wu, 2002, and Busse and Hefeker, 2007) and on MNCs’
strategic decisions such as changes in leverage, dividends remittance, and profit al-
location (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004, Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006, and Desai,
Foley, and Hines, 2008). However, to the best of my knowledge, there are no papers in
this literature that analyze global firms’ divestiture in response to regulatory shocks.
In summary, this chapter makes three contributions. First, it identifies the own-
ership structure of firms as a key factor shaping the pattern of M&A in EM. Second,
it shows that an increase in the level of regulations attracts firms with more opaque
corporate structures, shedding light on a new type of adverse selection problem.
Third, it documents a novel type of market response intended to reduce the impact
of regulations.
2.2 The Impact on the M&A Market
The previous chapter shows that private firms have more flexibility than listed ones in
terms of using mechanisms that assist them in bypassing a regulation. This flexibility
reduces the burden that private firms may have to shoulder, while listed firms must
shoulder the full burden. In this chapter, I test whether the cost differential is large
or small. The main empirical challenge is that the differential is firm-time-regulation
specific, with several factors rendering it unobservable. To show that the cost dif-
ferential is large, I take an alternative route and show that changes in the levels of
market regulations impose compliance costs of such magnitude that they shape the
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patterns of M&A transactions. The rationale is this: if in business-unfriendly mar-
kets listed firms face a much higher compliance cost than private ones, after a sudden
increase in business-unfriendly regulations, we should expect private firms to acquire
listed ones, since the former can mitigate the regulatory burden and increase the
value of a listed firm. In contrast, when the market becomes more business-friendly,
the benefits of being public should outweigh the effect of the lower compliance cost,
and we should expect listed firms to acquire private ones. In Appendix C I develop
a simple static model that exploits differences in the probability of being caught by-
passing regulations, and the cost of capital for listed and private firms; and I draw
such conclusions. In this chapter, I show that the predicted patterns are present in
Argentina, where the aforementioned regulation took place. In addition, I show how
these patterns respond to the ban on profit repatriation. I then expand my study to
include a broader sample of emerging markets and business-unfriendly regulations,
and provide evidence suggesting that my previous findings could be generalized. Last,
I show evidence suggesting that scrutiny and monitoring are the factors that drive
the compliance of listed firms.
2.2.1 The Impact on the Argentine M&A Market
The regulation exploited in the previous chapter had important consequences for firms
operating in Argentina. An article in The Economist titled “Waiting for Cristina to
Go” and dated December 2014 (partially reproduced in Appendix B) states that in
response to harshening business conditions and according to a study by a consultancy
firm, “40 foreign companies have left or frozen their operations since 2011”. In the
context of this paper, a foreign firm or MNC leaving the country would be reflected in
an M&A transaction wherein the MNC sells its Argentine subsidiary. In line with the
findings of the previous chapter, since private firms can significantly mitigate their
regulatory costs, one might expect that listed firms sell their operations to private
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firms. In addition, since private firms would value a listed firm more than its current
owner, one might expect that after the regulation, private firms would acquire listed
ones, while listed firms would stop acquiring private ones.
To test this theory, I first expand my list of firms by incorporating all the trans-
actions in the Zephyr M&A dataset7 where the Argentine subsidiary of a MNC —the
group of firms most affected by the regulation— was sold following the ban on in-
ternational transfers. My dataset comprises 762 M&A transactions over the period
2000-2015. For each year, I calculate two values: (i) the percentage of transactions
where the seller is a listed MNC and the acquirer is a private firm, and (ii) the
percentage of transactions where the seller is a private MNC and the acquirer is a
listed firm. In panel (A) of Figure 2.1, I plot both types of transactions and show
patterns consistent with my theory. More specifically, after the regulation, private
firms (which can bypass regulations and reduce the burden of compliance) started
acquiring listed firms at an extraordinary pace while listed firms stopped acquiring
private ones altogether. To show that the domicile of the company (i.e. domestic
vs. foreign) does not drive the results, in panel (B) I plot across time the percentage
of transactions where the acquirer is a domestic firm. The pattern suggests that the
domicile of the acquirer does not drive the results.
However, the graphical evidence presented is not totally sufficient, since the pat-
tern could respond to factors such as global trends rather than to differential com-
pliance costs. To test whether the regulation analyzed in the previous chapter drives
the patterns observed in Figure 2.1, I take a step further and analyze the type of
firms that sell their subsidiaries. In particular, I analyze whether firms that sell their
subsidiaries are listed firms that operate in industries more exposed to the regula-
tion. I define industry exposure as the transfers of earnings and royalties made by
7Described in the next section.
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a particular industry8 in 2011 (before the regulation took place) normalized by the
added value of that industry, as a proxy to its earnings. The higher the percentage
of added value that firms within an industry repatriate, the higher the impact of the
ban on transfers on that industry. For instance, before the regulation, the oil and gas
industry was transferring abroad 7.83% of its added value, while the textile indus-
try was transferring only 0.31% of its added value. Comparatively, the oil and gas
industry was more affected by the regulation than the textile industry. I calculate
the likelihood of selling a subsidiary by using the percentage of MNCs operating in
a particular industry that sell their subsidiary in year t. To test whether listed firms
respond more to the regulation than private firms, I calculate this variable for listed
and private MNCs separately.
I use a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) setting and exploit three
sources of variation; (1) whether the transaction takes place before the regulation,
(2) whether the industry is significantly exposed to the regulation, and (3) whether
the parent firm of the MNC is listed.
The empirical specification is as follows:
Sells,l,t = α +HighExposures + Postt + Listed+
HighExposures × Postt +HighExposures × Listed+ Postt × Listed+
HighExposures × Postt × Listed+ ϵs,l,t (2.1)
where s is the industry, l is an indicator of listed firms, and t denotes time.
HighExposures is an indicator that is set to one for industries that are in the top
quartile of exposure, and set to zero for industries in the bottom quartile of exposure.
Postt is an indicator set to one in terms of years after the ban on profits repatriation
8I use the same 18 industry categories that the Argentine Central Bank uses to report repatriation
of earnings and royalties.
41
was imposed, and Listed is an indicator set to one for listed firms. Standard errors
are clustered at the industry level to account for possible serial correlation in the error
terms. The coefficient of interest is the triple interaction term, which measures the
comparative likelihood of selling a subsidiary of listed firms that are highly exposed
to the regulation after it was imposed, relative to their private counterparties.
The results of the test are reported in Table 2.2. The coefficient for the triple
interaction term is positive and significant, showing that the regulation has a different
effect on listed than on private firms in the same industries and suggesting that the
M&A patterns observed in Argentina after the ban on profits repatriation reflect the
differential cost of compliance between listed and private firms. In the rest of this
chapter, I test whether this effect also holds in other EM.
2.2.2 The Impact on the M&A Market in EM
In this section, I test whether the previous findings can be extended to EM and
business-unfriendly regulations in general, and present evidence that they can. More
specifically, I show that when a market becomes more business-unfriendly, private
firms acquire operations from listed ones, and when markets become less business-
unfriendly, listed firms acquire operations from private ones. In addition, I provide
evidence that suggests that monitoring plays a key role in determining compliance.
Lastly, I rule out several alternative explanations for the findings.
2.2.2.1 Data and Methodology
Regulatory Data To test whether the M&A patterns are present in EM in general,
a measure of how business-unfriendly a market is, is required. There are different
publications and indexes that achieve this goal. The closest one to my idea of an
unregulated market is that of Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 2015, who publish the
Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report and create an index to measure
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economic freedom in 141 nations. First published in 1996, it has remained a standard
reference in the literature; its different editions have been widely used and cited, with
approximately 3,700 cites as of November 2016.
The report “measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries
are supportive of economic freedom.” For each country-year, the report provides 42
different measures of EF grouped into 5 different categories,9 and then combines
them to provide an overall index of EF . The 2015 report includes information for
the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and then yearly data from 2000 to 2013. To
understand whether regulatory events affect M&A transactions, the information used
is restricted to the years between 2000 and 2013. The measure of EF ranges from 0
to 10, with an index of 10 given to a country where free competition is the absolute
rule. For the countries in the sample, the lowest value is 2.88 (Zimbabwe, 2005) and
the highest value is 9.07 (Hong Kong, 2008). A higher value indicates more EF , or a
less business-unfriendly environment. To be consistent with the index, I will refer to a
country that becomes less business-unfriendly as one where the EF index increased.
In contrast, I will refer to a market that becomes more business-unfriendly as one
where the EF index decreased.
While other similar measures are available, they are not suitable for my study for
different reasons. One such measure is the Doing Business Index issued by the World
Bank.10 This index provides measures of Business Regulations across countries, which
makes it appropriate for my study. However, it measures the de jure rules (i.e. what
should happen), in contrast to the de facto measures (i.e. what does happen). As
shown in Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett, 2015, there is almost zero correlation
between the de jure and the de facto measures as reported by firms in the Enterprise
9Size of Government, Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Access to Sound Money,
Freedom to Trade Internationally, and Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.
10Available at www.doingbusiness.org.
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Surveys, also issued by the World Bank.11 To check the relevance of the EF Index and
contrast its usefulness with the Doing Business Index, I test the correlation between
the EF Index and the Enterprise Surveys data for the percentage of time that senior
management spend dealing with the requirements of government regulation. I find
that the correlation is negative and significant at the 1% level. The less business-
unfriendly the country is (higher levels of EF ), the lower the percentage of time senior
management spends dealing with regulations. In contrast, when I test the correlation
between the Doing Business Index and the Enterprise Surveys data, I find that the
correlation is not significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with findings in
Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett, 2015.
Another commonly cited database is that of the Heritage Foundation. One prob-
lem with this dataset is that the indexes do not seem to provide the level of detail
needed in my study. For instance, the first country in the dataset with available in-
formation is Albania. For this country, the index of Financial Freedom only changes
three times in the last twenty years. For the following country, Algeria, the number
of changes is also only three. A third index constructed specifically for EM is that by
Karolyi, 2015. This index provides a remarkable level of detail and would be suitable
for my study, except that the data is only available for 2012 and the author himself
warns about the lack of consistent data to construct an annual index.
M&A Data I use Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr database and consider all the com-
pleted M&A transactions that were announced between years 2000 and 2014 and were
completed by the end of 2015. An advantage that this database has over Thomson
One is that it includes information on more than 281,000 deals, while Thomson One
has information on 247,000 deals for the same period due to stricter restrictions on
the minimum deal value. In addition, it includes more information on the vendor for
11The Enterprise Surveys provide extremely rich information. However, the surveys are not
conducted on a yearly basis, which make them inappropriate for my study.
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each transaction.
In accordance with the goal of the paper, i.e. to understand how firms operate
in business-unfriendly markets, I use observations in which the target company is
located in a country with a minimum level of regulatory burden. To determine
whether a country falls in this category, I calculate its average EF index for the
period under study and keep a list of the countries in the three lowest quintiles.12
As is customary in the literature, transactions where the target company belongs to
a regulated industry such as utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) or financial institutions
(SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. In addition, since the focus of this paper is on
firms that sell their operations,13 I focus on the transactions where the final stake
the acquirer has is greater than or equal to 95%.14 Finally, I exclude transactions in
which the companies involved are state-owned. The final sample is left with 51,858
observations, summarized in Table 2.3.
Methodology In this section I describe the methodology used to test whether
changes in the regulatory level of a country trigger M&A transactions, which in turn
suggest large differential compliance costs for listed firms. For each transaction in
the database, I identify whether the seller and the acquirer are listed or private. I
categorize each transaction as: listed acquirer/private seller, listed acquirer/listed
12The countries identified as restricted, and for which macroeconomic data are available, in-
clude: Albania, Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, In-
donesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
13As opposed to a reduction in the percentage of ownership, which would still make the company
liable if found bypassing regulations.
14In some cases, there are shareholders with a minority interest, therefore the acquirer does not
have 100% of the shares after the transaction. The 95% threshold allows for some flexibility. The
results are robust to different specifications, such as the exclusion of transactions where the acquired
stake is lower than 50%
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seller, private acquirer/listed seller, or private acquirer/private seller. The data are
aggregated at the country-year-category level. To control for the changing volume
of M&A transactions, the number of transactions in each country-year-category is
normalized by the total number of transactions in that country-year. As a result,
we are left with the percentage of transactions that fall under each category in each
country-year. I merge this panel with the EF database and include the EF index for
each country-year. Following Singh and Jun, 1995, I lag the EF index by one year to
account for physical and procedural constraints that prevent transactions from being
immediate, such as the search for counterparts, due diligence, and negotiation. Thus,
if a market becomes more regulated in year t, we are more likely to observe changes
in the percentage of transactions of the affected category in year t + 1. The panel
dataset includes the percentage of transactions that fall under each one of the four
categories of transactions between years 2001 and 201415 and the lagged EF index
for that country-year.
Since minor changes in regulatory levels would hardly trigger decisions as impor-
tant as acquisitions, I follow Alesina and Dollar, 2000 in creating a dummy variable
(Episodec,t−1) indicating whether there was an “episode”, which is defined as a sud-
den change of at least one standard deviation on the level of the EF index from one
year to another, lagged by one period. The econometric specifications tested are the
following:
% TXc,t,L→P = γ1×Episodec,t−1+γ2×IndexEFc,t−1 +γ3Episodec,t−1×IndexEFc,t−1
+ γ4ψc,t−1 + δc + δt + εc,t,i (2.2)
The explained variable is the percentage of transactions where listed firms acquire
private ones in country c at time t, and the explanatory variables are: 1) an indicator
of whether there was a sudden change on the EF index (Episodec,t−1), 2) the lagged
15The time frame is limited by the EF dataset, that includes information for years 2000-2013.
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level of EF (IndexEFc,t−1), and 3) an interaction term. A second specification re-
placing % TXc,t,L→P with % TXc,t,P→L (i.e. where private firms acquire listed ones)
is run to test my hypothesis. ψc,t−1 includes lagged macro control variables that the
literature indicates have explanatory power in predicting M&A transactions: Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit
to private sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), exchange rate
with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. This data is ob-
tained from World Bank’s DataBank. For robustness, additional control variables
are included in the corresponding tables.
In addition, two sets of fixed effects are included: country (δc) and year (δt).
The former controls for time-invariant characteristics of transactions that take place
within a country. For instance, in country A, it could be that for most years, 50% of
the transactions occur between listed acquirers and listed targets, and the rest occur
between private acquirers and private targets, while maintaining a stable composition
of firms. At the same time, in country B, 50% of the transactions occur between listed
acquirers and private targets, and the rest occur between private acquirers and listed
targets, also leading to a stable composition of firms but with different base values for
each category of transaction. The latter fixed effect controls for common shocks that
might affect the M&A market in a particular year. For instance, if the stock market is
overvalued, listed companies might use shares to cheaply acquire private companies
and we would observe a higher percentage of transactions where the acquirer is a
listed firm.
The effect on M&A might not be symmetric when a country becomes more
business-unfriendly compared to when it becomes less business-unfriendly. Thus,
I test separately the effect of sudden increases (deregulatory episodes) and sudden
decreases (regulatory episodes) in the level of EF . In addition, to impart inter-
pretability to the coefficients obtained from the regression, the EF index is centered
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at three different levels: mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and two
standard deviations below the mean. This allows me to test the effect of a regula-
tory (deregulatory) episode in countries that have different base levels of EF .16 The
coefficients of interest are γ1, γ2 and γ3. γ1 measures the impact of a regulatory
(deregulatory) episode on the percentage of transactions of each type. The coefficient
γ2 measures the impact of a unitary change on the EF index on the percentage of
transactions of a certain category when the change in this coefficient is gradual, i.e.
there is no sudden change. Lastly, the coefficient γ3 measures how the effect of a
regulatory (deregulatory) episode depends on the level of EF .
If the findings of the previous sections can be generalized, the percentage of trans-
actions wherein private firms acquire listed ones should increase after a regulatory
event, i.e. when markets become more business-unfriendly. In contrast, the percent-
age of transactions wherein private firms acquire listed ones should decrease after a
deregulatory event, i.e. when markets become more business-friendly. The expected
results are summarized in Table 2.1, where (⇑) represents an expected increase in
transactions and (⇓) represents an expected decrease in transactions. The effect of
regulatory and deregulatory episodes on the other two types of transactions (public
acquirer/public target and private acquirer/private target) are tested for robustness
purposes. If the differential compliance cost drives the results, there should be no ef-
fect that regulatory or deregulatory episodes have on these two types of transactions.
2.2.2.2 Results
In this section I present the results of the tests measuring whether differential com-
pliance costs are so impactful that they trigger M&A transactions. When a market
suddenly becomes more business-unfriendly, we might expect more transactions be-
16Among the countries with mean levels of EF we find countries such as Mexico and Russia,
among those with low levels of EF Nigeria and Pakistan, and among those with even lower levels










More business unfriendly ⇑ ⇓
Less business friendly ⇓ ⇑
Table 2.1: Predicted Results
tween private acquirers and listed targets. In contrast, when a market becomes less
business-unfriendly we might expect more transactions between listed acquirers and
private targets.
Markets becoming more business-unfriendly I test whether a regulatory
episode has an impact on M&A transactions in EM. Table 2.4 shows the results for
transactions wherein private firms acquire listed ones (panel A), and wherein listed
firms acquire private ones (panel B).
The results in panel A of Table 2.4 show that after a regulatory episode, the
percentage of transactions wherein a private company acquires a listed company in-
creases by between 5 and 28 percentage points, from a baseline of 8.2%. This result
is consistent with the high differential compliance costs for listed firms. I observe
that the effect is significant at the 5% level in countries with relatively low levels
of EF (one and two standard deviations below the mean, respectively), and that in
those markets the magnitude of the coefficient is large and significant. The results
do not change with the inclusion of region-year fixed effects which control for shocks
affecting certain regions in certain years. Similarly, the results in panel B of Table
2.4 show that after a regulatory episode, the percentage of transactions wherein listed
firms acquire private ones decreases by between 5 and 14 percentage points from a
baseline of 29.6%, and that the effect is statistically significant for countries with
different levels of EF .
The coefficient γ2 —reflecting the change in the percentage of transactions when
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the level of EF changes gradually— does not appear to be significant. Thus if the
change is slow, the impact on the percentage of transactions is nil. The coefficient
that accompanies the interaction term has the sign opposite of γ1, indicating that
markets that are less business-unfriendly are affected less severely by a regulatory
episode than more business-unfriendly markets.
Markets becoming less business-unfriendly When a market becomes less
business-unfriendly, the benefits of being public outweigh the (now lower) compli-
ance costs. We find more transactions wherein listed firms acquire private ones, and
fewer transactions wherein private firms acquire listed ones. Table 2.5 shows the re-
sults for transactions wherein private firms acquire listed ones (panel A), and wherein
listed firms acquire private ones (panel B) after a deregulatory event.
The results in panel A of Table 2.5 show that when there is a deregulatory episode
and a market becomes less business-unfriendly, the percentage of transactions wherein
private firms acquire listed ones decreases by between 8 and 15 percentage points.
The effect is significant at the 5% level in countries with relative low levels of EF .
Again, the results survive the inclusion of region-year fixed effects that control for
shocks affecting certain regions in certain years. Similarly, the results in panel B
show that when there is a deregulatory event and the market becomes less business-
unfriendly, the percentage of transactions wherein listed firms acquire private ones
increases. The coefficient has the expected sign but is not statistically significant.
2.2.2.3 Pinning Down the Mechanism
Having ruled out in the corresponding section that the differential behavior of listed
and private firms responds to differences in size, ownership structure, or visibility,
I test whether the factor that affects compliance might be monitoring. A firm that
is strictly audited has a higher probability of being caught bypassing regulations
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than one that is loosely audited, and therefore has stronger incentives to comply.
If monitoring drives compliance, the M&A patterns shown in the previous section
should be stronger for firms that are more rigorously audited and where enforcement
is stricter than for those that are loosely audited, even when these firms operate in
the same market.
An example is that of Wal-Mart in Mexico, and the corruption case it was involved
in. Wal-Mart of Mexico is a subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and is listed in the
Mexican Stock Exchange under ticker symbol WALMEX, while its parent company
Wal-mart Stores Inc. is listed on the New York Stock Exchange under ticker symbol
WMT. In the early 2000s officers from the Mexican subsidiary paid $24 million in
bribes to Mexican officers to obtain permits to open stores in protected zones. No ac-
tions were taken by the Mexican auditors or by the regulator. However, when in 2011
the company disclosed “possible violations” to the SEC related to this incident, the
company faced significant charges, suggesting that auditing and enforcement stan-
dards differ across listing markets, and that the consequences of bypassing regulations
also differ.
To provide further support for my interpretation, I categorize transactions into
those involving firms listed in countries with stricter auditing and enforcement stan-
dards, and those involving firms listed in countries with more lenient standards. I use
the index constructed by Brown, Preiato, and Tarca, 2014. This index combines 9
factors related to auditing standards (including as requirements for auditor rotation
and auditing intensity) and 6 factors related to enforcement standards (including
the relative size of the securities market regulator). According to this index, the
United States represents a country with stricter standards, with a score of 56/56,
while Ukraine represents the country with more lenient standards, with a ranking of
6/56. I divide countries between those that are above the median level of auditing
and enforcement standards (i.e. stricter standards) and those that are below (i.e.
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more lenient standards). The regression results in Table 2.8 show that the effect that
sudden changes in the levels of EF have in the M&A market is of large magnitude
and significant only for companies listed in countries with stricter auditing and en-
forcement standards. This result supports the notion that listed firms comply with
regulations because they are subject to stricter scrutiny.
2.2.2.4 Robustness Tests
In this section, I provide evidence that further supports my hypothesis via several
additional sources of heterogeneity. In the interest of brevity a summary of the tables
is provided. The remaining tables are available upon request.
Additional Controls For robustness, I repeat the previous tests with additional
controls. First, in order to absorb potential country-specific trends, I include controls
with linear and quadratic terms in the percentage of transactions in each category.
Second, to control for potential differential effects that growth opportunities have on
listed and private firms that might also drive transactions, I follow Bekaert et al.,
2007 and construct a measure of Local Growth Opportunities equal to the log of a
country’s market price to earnings ratio. As with the authors, my preferred source
is Datastream. When data are not available, I use S&P’s Emerging Markets Data
Base. I lag this measure by one year, which is consistent with my treatment of other
macroeconomic controls. Unfortunately, 29 of my 59 countries are not covered by
Datastream, S&P, nor MSCI. For those countries, I set the log of the ratio equal to
zero. The results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that the significance of the coefficients
survives the inclusion of these controls.
Private-Private and Listed-Listed transactions There are two types of trans-
actions that should exhibit no patterns at all in response to regulatory episodes:
those wherein listed firms acquire listed ones, and those wherein private firms acquire
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private ones. However, analysis of M&A transactions in these categories can provide
further support for the previous findings. Since regulatory (deregulatory) episodes do
not generate differential compliance costs for firms in these categories, we should find
no effect on the percentage of M&A transactions in response to changes in regulations.
I find that after a regulatory (deregulatory) episode, the percentage of transactions
wherein listed firms acquire listed firms and wherein private firms acquire private firms
does not change. This result helps identify the flexibility enjoyed by private firms in
business-unfriendly markets as the driver of M&A transactions.
Firms Operating in Developed Markets For the advantage of private firms to
endure, non-compliers must perceive a substantial probability of getting away with
bypassing regulations. Since DM have stricter enforcement of regulations for both
listed and private firms, the advantage private firms have over listed ones when dealing
with regulations is absent. This means that regulatory episodes do not generate
differential compliance costs, nor do they trigger value-creating M&A. Therefore I
expect the M&A patterns to be nil in those markets.
To test this hypothesis, I run the specification detailed in the previous section
with countries in the first two deciles of levels of EF —those that were excluded from
my main test. Table 2.9 shows that the coefficients do not have the expected sign and
are not significant at the 10% level, meaning that regulatory (deregulatory) episodes
in countries with higher levels of EF do not have an effect on the composition of
M&A transactions.
Political Risks Listed firms generally have a more dispersed ownership structure
than private ones, and this might affect their risk aversion. If the EF index is
correlated with measures of risk, the results found in the previous section could
derive from differences in risk aversion and not from a differential burden imposed
by regulations. To rule out this possibility, I repeat the previous tests using the
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Political Risk Index included in the International Country Risk Guide, developed by
the Political Risk Services Group.17 Despite its name, this index includes information
on 12 risk factors that address not only political risk but also different components
of political institutions risk, such as religious and ethnic tensions. The higher the
index, the lower the political risk. Therefore, a reduction in the index implies higher
political risk, as with the EF Index.
I run two tests to check whether the results are driven by risk factors and not
by the burden of regulations. First, I include the index as an additional control on
the main specification and find that the results remain unchanged. Second, I repeat
the analysis replacing the EF index with the political risk index, including a dummy
variable indicating whether the political risk index exhibits a sudden change of more
than one standard deviation from one year to another, as was done with the EF
index. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show that sudden changes in the political risk index do
not seem to have an effect on the percentage of transactions between listed acquirers
and target firms, nor do they seem to affect the percentage of transactions between
private acquirers and listed targets.
Placebo Test To rule out that my results are driven by spurious correlations, I
repeat the analysis and randomize the allocation of sudden changes in the level of EF .
For each country-year, I generate a random number using the uniform distribution.
To the country-years with the highest h numbers, I assign a deregulatory episode. To
the country-years with the lowest l numbers, I assign a regulatory episode. I choose h
and l so that my placebo sample has the same number of deregulatory and regulatory
episodes as the original sample. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show that no single coefficient




This paper shows that the differential compliance cost imposed on listed firms by
higher compliance rates with regulations in EM is of such magnitude that it shapes
the pattern of M&A transactions. In particular, I demonstrate that when a market
becomes more business-unfriendly, private firms acquire listed ones. In contrast, when
a market becomes less business-unfriendly, listed firms acquire private ones.
The findings in this paper have important implications for managers and policy-
makers. For the former, this paper shows that the differential compliance cost with
regulations in EM is a key factor to be considered when deciding whether to go public.
For policymakers, this paper shows that changes in the regulatory environment
shape the composition of firms that operate in a country. In particular, business-
unfriendly regulations attract firms that defy those regulations, thereby limiting the
effectiveness of the policies. Future research might attempt to quantitatively measure
this, and look at the welfare implications of attracting firms that partially mitigate
the effect of regulations.
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2.4 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Type of Transactions before/after Ban on International Transfers
(A) Listing Status
(B) Domicile
These graphs plot M&A transactions wherein a MNC sells its Argentine subsidiary,
between the years 2006 and 2015. Figure (A) shows the percentage of the total number
of transactions where the operation is between a private acquirer and a listed target
(dark blue) and between a listed acquirer and a listed target (light gray). Figure
(B) shows the percentage of the total number of transactions where the acquirer is a
domestic firm. The vertical line demarcates the pre and post periods. Source: Zephyr
Database.
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HighExposures × Postt -0.194**
(0.074)
HighExposures × Listed -0.263*
(0.118)
Postt × Listed 0.0771
(0.048)




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table presents the regression of the percentage of MNCs in each industry that,
after regulation A5264, sold their operations in Argentina based on the exposure of
that industry to the regulation. The exposure to the regulation is measured as the
percentage of added value that was being transferred abroad before the regulation.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
57




Asia Pacific 26,724 26 14
North America 36 2 2
Africa 2,801 51 33
Latin America and the
Caribbean 5,093 18 19
Europe 17,204 14 10
Total 51,858 111 78
This table summarizes the number of M&A deals per region of the world between
2000 and 2014, the number of deregulatory episodes (sudden increase in the level of
Economic Freedom), and the number of regulatory episodes (sudden decrease in the
level of Economic Freedom) in the final dataset.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Economic Freedom in
the M&A market
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 0.0672* 0.0546 0.178** 0.170** 0.289** 0.286**
(0.038) (0.035) (0.080) (0.077) (0.132) (0.130)
EF Index (centered) -0.0134 -0.0153 -0.0134 -0.0153 -0.0134 -0.0153
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
Regulatory Episodet−1× EF Index (centered) -0.140** -0.146** -0.140** -0.146** -0.140** -0.146**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.172 0.277 0.172 0.277 0.172 0.277
Listed acquirer and Private target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 -0.0746** -0.0581* -0.0758** -0.0988** -0.0769 -0.139*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.055) (0.072)
EF Index (centered) 0.0136 0.0324 0.0136 0.0324 0.0136 0.0324
(0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055)
Regulatory Episodet−1× EF Index (centered) 0.00146 0.0513 0.00146 0.0513 0.00146 0.0513
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.259 0.328 0.259 0.328 0.259 0.328
This table presents the effect that a sudden reduction in the level of EF has
on the percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and listed tar-
gets (Panel (a)), and between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)).
Regulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was a reduction of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF in a certain
country. In columns [1] and [2] the index of EF is centered at its mean value to give
meaning to the coefficient of Regulatory Episodet−1. In columns [3] and [4] the index
of EF is centered at its mean value minus one standard deviation. In columns [5]
and [6] the index of EF is centered at its mean minus two standard deviations. The
dependent variable is the percentage of transactions in a country-year between pri-
vate acquirers and listed targets (Panel (a)), or between listed acquirers and private
targets (Panel (b)). All specifications include the following macroeconomic control
variables lagged by one year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, do-
mestic credit to private sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate),
log of exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP.
Standard errors are clustered at the target firm’s country level and are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of a Sudden Increase in the Level of Economic Freedom in the
M&A market
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 -0.0225 -0.0237 -0.0761** -0.0876** -0.130** -0.152**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.053) (0.059)
EF Index (centered) -0.0308 -0.0348 -0.0308 -0.0348 -0.0308 -0.0348
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Deregulatory Episodet−1× EF Index (centered) 0.0676* 0.0807** 0.0676* 0.0807** 0.0676* 0.0807**
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.151 0.260 0.151 0.260 0.151 0.260
Listed acquirer and Private target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 0.0309 0.0161 0.0569 0.0404 0.0829 0.0647
(0.050) (0.052) (0.086) (0.093) (0.133) (0.143)
EF Index (centered) 0.0246 0.0462 0.0246 0.0462 0.0246 0.0462
(0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.052)
Deregulatory Episodet−1× EF Index (centered) -0.0328 -0.0306 -0.0328 -0.0306 -0.0328 -0.0306
(0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.256 0.326 0.256 0.326 0.256 0.326
This table presents the effect that a sudden increase in the level of EF within a
country has on the percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and
listed targets (Panel (a)), and between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)).
Deregulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was an increase of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF . In columns [1]
and [2] the index of EF is centered at its mean value to give meaning to the coefficient
of Deregulatory Episodet−1. In columns [3] and [4] the index of EF is centered at its
mean value minus one standard deviation. In columns [5] and [6] the index of EF is
centered at its mean value minus two standard deviations. The dependent variable is
the percentage of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers and listed
targets (Panel (a)), or between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)). All
specifications include the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one
year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private
sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate
with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors
are clustered at the target firm’s country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Economic Freedom in
the M&A market - Additional Controls
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 0.0719* 0.0484 0.0715* 0.196** 0.146** 0.193** 0.320** 0.243** 0.315**
(0.041) (0.034) (0.041) (0.084) (0.064) (0.085) (0.138) (0.104) (0.140)
EF Index (centered) 0.0461 -0.0197 0.0243 0.0461 -0.0197 0.0243 0.0461 -0.0197 0.0243
(0.056) (0.023) (0.059) (0.056) (0.023) (0.059) (0.056) (0.023) (0.059)
Regulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) -0.156** -0.123** -0.153** -0.156** -0.123** -0.153** -0.156** -0.123** -0.153**
(0.073) (0.055) (0.074) (0.073) (0.055) (0.074) (0.073) (0.055) (0.074)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Quadratic Trend Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Growth Opportunities No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 704 668 668 704 668 668 704 668 668
R-Squared 0.364 0.289 0.375 0.364 0.289 0.375 0.364 0.289 0.375
Listed acquirer and Private target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 -0.0544 -0.0587* -0.0518 -0.111* -0.113** -0.112* -0.167** -0.167** -0.172*
(0.044) (0.035) (0.048) (0.057) (0.048) (0.062) (0.080) (0.065) (0.086)
EF Index (centered) -0.00429 0.0114 -0.0235 -0.00429 0.0114 -0.0235 -0.00429 0.0114 -0.0235
(0.094) (0.061) (0.106) (0.094) (0.061) (0.106) (0.094) (0.061) (0.106)
Regulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) 0.0713* 0.0685** 0.0757* 0.0713* 0.0685** 0.0757* 0.0713* 0.0685** 0.0757*
(0.038) (0.027) (0.040) (0.038) (0.027) (0.040) (0.038) (0.027) (0.040)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Quadratic Trend Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Growth Opportunities No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 704 668 668 704 668 668 704 668 668
R-Squared 0.490 0.342 0.493 0.490 0.342 0.493 0.490 0.342 0.493
This table presents the effect that a sudden reduction in the level of EF has
on the percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and listed tar-
gets (Panel (a)) and between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)).
Regulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was a reduction of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF in a certain
country. In columns [1], [2], and [3] the index of Economic Freedom is centered at its
mean value to give meaning to the coefficient of Regulatory Episodet−1. In columns
[4], [5], and [6], the index of Economic Freedom is centered at its mean value minus
one standard deviation. In columns [7], [8], and [9] the index of EF is centered at its
mean value minus two standard deviations. The dependent variable is the percentage
of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers and listed targets (Panel
(a)), or between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)). All specifications
include the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one year: GDP per
capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private sector, interest
rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate with respect to
the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the
target firm’s country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.7: The Effect of a Sudden Increase in the Level of Economic Freedom in the
M&A market - Additional Controls
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 -0.0338 -0.0186 -0.0204 -0.102** -0.0801** -0.0918* -0.170** -0.142** -0.163**
(0.034) (0.025) (0.038) (0.044) (0.035) (0.047) (0.071) (0.059) (0.076)
EF Index (centered) -0.0372 -0.0543* -0.0786 -0.0372 -0.0543* -0.0786 -0.0372 -0.0543* -0.0786
(0.085) (0.029) (0.090) (0.085) (0.029) (0.090) (0.085) (0.029) (0.090)
Deregulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) 0.0861* 0.0775** 0.0902* 0.0861* 0.0775** 0.0902* 0.0861* 0.0775** 0.0902*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.037) (0.048)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Quadratic Trend Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Growth Opportunities No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 704 668 668 704 668 668 704 668 668
R-Squared 0.340 0.271 0.352 0.340 0.271 0.352 0.340 0.271 0.352
Listed acquirer and Private target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 0.0221 0.0130 0.0166 0.0473 0.0335 0.0390 0.0724 0.0540 0.0613
(0.064) (0.056) (0.073) (0.109) (0.101) (0.126) (0.163) (0.155) (0.189)
EF Index (centered) 0.0420 0.0374 0.0312 0.0420 0.0374 0.0312 0.0420 0.0374 0.0312
(0.105) (0.058) (0.115) (0.105) (0.058) (0.115) (0.105) (0.058) (0.115)
Deregulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) -0.0318 -0.0259 -0.0282 -0.0318 -0.0259 -0.0282 -0.0318 -0.0259 -0.0282
(0.074) (0.073) (0.085) (0.074) (0.073) (0.085) (0.074) (0.073) (0.085)
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Quadratic Trend Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Growth Opportunities No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 704 668 668 704 668 668 704 668 668
R-Squared 0.487 0.338 0.490 0.487 0.338 0.490 0.487 0.338 0.490
This table presents the effect that a sudden increase in the level of EF within a
country has on the percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and
listed targets (Panel (a)) and between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel
(b)). Deregulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year,
there was an increase of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF . In
columns [1], [2], and [3] the index of Economic Freedom is centered at its mean value
to give meaning to the coefficient of Deregulatory Episodet−1. In columns [4], [5],
and [6], the index of Economic Freedom is centered at its mean value minus one
standard deviation. In columns [7], [8], and [9] the index of EF is centered at its
mean value minus two standard deviations. The dependent variable is the percentage
of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers and listed targets (Panel
(a)), or between listed acquirers and private targets (Panel (b)). All specifications
include the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one year: GDP per
capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private sector, interest
rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate with respect to
the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the
target firm’s country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8: The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Economic Freedom for
Companies Listed in Markets with Stricter (More Lenient) Auditing and Enforcement
Standards
Companies Listed in Markets with Stricter Auditing and Enforcement Standards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P → L P → L L → P L → P
Regulatory Episodet−1 0.113* 0.123* -0.0695** -0.134**
(0.065) (0.072) (0.031) (0.052)
EF Index (centered) -0.00783 -0.0152 0.0294 0.0227
(0.016) (0.023) (0.031) (0.048)
Regulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) -0.101* -0.102* 0.0406 0.0787*
(0.057) (0.059) (0.025) (0.042)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.192 0.461 0.231 0.499
Companies Listed in Markets with More Lenient Auditing and Enforcement
Standards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P → L P → L L → P L → P
Regulatory Episodet−1 0.0266 0.0243 -0.0153 -0.00865
(0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022)
EF Index (centered) 0.00565 0.0167 -0.00405 -0.00149
(0.007) (0.012) (0.023) (0.037)
Regulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) -0.00515 -0.00674 -0.00354 -0.00440
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704
R-Squared 0.171 0.337 0.476 0.622
This table presents the effect that a sudden reduction in the level of EF has on the
percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and listed targets (columns
[1] and [2]), and between listed acquirers and private targets (columns [3] and [4])
when the listed company is under stricter auditing and enforcement standards (panel
A) as well as when it is under more lenient auditing and enforcement standards (panel
B). Regulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was a reduction of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF in a certain
country. The index of EF is centered at its mean value minus one standard deviation
to give meaning to the coefficient of Regulatory Episodet−1. All specifications include
the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one year: GDP per capita
growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private sector, interest rate spread
(lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate with respect to the US dollar,
and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the target firm’s
country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Economic Freedom on
firms operating in Developed Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P → L P → L L → P L → P
Regulatory Episodet−1 -0.00669 -0.0131 -0.0664 -0.0588
(0.025) (0.027) (0.044) (0.050)
EF Index (centered) -0.0232 -0.0454 -0.0675 -0.0919
(0.029) (0.030) (0.083) (0.089)
Regulatory Episodet−1 × EF Index (centered) 0.0267 0.0419 0.0546 0.0557
(0.026) (0.030) (0.038) (0.041)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes
N 420 420 420 420
R-Squared 0.189 0.320 0.350 0.476
This table presents the effect that a sudden reduction in the level of EF has on the
percentage of M&A transactions between private acquirers and listed targets (columns
[1] and [2]), and between listed acquirers and private targets (columns [3] and [4])
for firms operating in developed countries. Regulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator
equal to one if, in the previous year, there was a reduction of at least one standard
deviation in the level of EF in a certain country. The index of EF is centered
at its mean value minus one standard deviation to give meaning to the coefficient
of Regulatory Episodet−1. All specifications include the following macroeconomic
control variables lagged by one year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per
capita, domestic credit to private sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus
deposit rate), log of exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a
percentage of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the target firm’s country level
and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
64
Table 2.10: The Effect of a Sudden Increase in the Level of Political Risk
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Destabilization Episodet−1 -0.00562 0.000137 0.0284 0.0377 0.0625 0.0753
(0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.038) (0.054) (0.054)
Political Risk Index (centered) 0.0000651 0.000809 0.0000651 0.000809 0.0000651 0.000809
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Destabilization Episodet−1× PR Index (centered) -0.00339* -0.00374* -0.00339* -0.00374* -0.00339* -0.00374*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 643 643 643 643 643 643
R-Squared 0.155 0.272 0.155 0.272 0.155 0.272
Listed target and Private acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Destabilization Episodet−1 0.00259 -0.00156 -0.0474 -0.0300 -0.0974 -0.0584
(0.032) (0.031) (0.048) (0.048) (0.076) (0.074)
Political Risk Index (centered) -0.00139 -0.000819 -0.00139 -0.000819 -0.00139 -0.000819
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Destabilization Episodet−1× PR Index (centered) 0.00497 0.00283 0.00497 0.00283 0.00497 0.00283
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 643 643 643 643 643 643
R-Squared 0.241 0.317 0.241 0.317 0.241 0.317
This table presents the effect that a sudden increase in the level of Political Risk (re-
duction in the PR index) within a country has on the percentage of M&A transactions
between private acquirers and listed targets, and between listed acquirers and private
targets. Destabilization Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous
year, there was an increase of at least one standard deviation in the level of Political
Risk in a certain country. In columns [1] and [2] the index of Political Risk is centered
at its mean value to give meaning to the coefficient of Destabilization Episodet−1.
In columns [3] and [4] the index of Political Risk is centered at its mean minus one
standard deviation. In columns [5] and [6] the index of Political Risk is centered at
its mean minus two standard deviations. The dependent variable is the percentage
of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers and listed targets. All
specifications include the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one
year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private
sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate
with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors
are clustered at the target firm’s country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11: The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Political Risk
Listed target and Private acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Stabilization Episodet−1 0.0232 0.0117 -0.00753 -0.0175 -0.0382 -0.0468
(0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.045) (0.054)
Political Risk Index (centered) -0.000805 0.0000748 -0.000805 0.0000748 -0.000805 0.0000748
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stabilization Episodet−1× PR Index (centered) 0.00305* 0.00291 0.00305* 0.00291 0.00305* 0.00291
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 643 643 643 643 643 643
R-Squared 0.157 0.271 0.157 0.271 0.157 0.271
Private target and Listed acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Stabilization Episodet−1 -0.0493 -0.0415 -0.0599 -0.0716 -0.0706 -0.102
(0.036) (0.037) (0.059) (0.058) (0.090) (0.088)
Political Risk Index (centered) -0.000315 -0.000169 -0.000315 -0.000169 -0.000315 -0.000169
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Stabilization Episodet−1× PR Index (centered) 0.00106 0.00299 0.00106 0.00299 0.00106 0.00299
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 643 643 643 643 643 643
R-Squared 0.241 0.318 0.241 0.318 0.241 0.318
This table presents the effect that a sudden reduction in the level of Political Risk (in-
crease in the PR index) within a country has on the percentage of M&A transactions
between private acquirers and listed targets, and between listed acquirers and private
targets. Stabilization Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year,
there was a reduction of at least one standard deviation in the level of Political Risk
in a certain country. In columns [1] and [2] the index of Political Risk is centered
at its mean value to give meaning to the coefficient of Stabilization Episodet−1. In
columns [3] and [4] the index of Political Risk is centered at its mean minus one
standard deviation. In columns [5] and [6] the index of Political Risk is centered at
its mean minus two standard deviations. The dependent variable is the percentage
of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers and listed targets. All
specifications include the following macroeconomic control variables lagged by one
year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, domestic credit to private
sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate
with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors
are clustered at the target firm’s country level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Placebo Test - The Effect of a Sudden Reduction in the Level of Economic
Freedom
Private acquirer and Listed target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 -0.00670 0.00324 -0.0103 0.00341 -0.0140 0.00359
(0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037) (0.049)
EF Index (centered) -0.0291 -0.0338 -0.0291 -0.0338 -0.0291 -0.0338
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Regulatory Episodet−1 x EF Index (centered) 0.00460 -0.000216 0.00460 -0.000216 0.00460 -0.000216
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-squared 0.145 0.253 0.145 0.253 0.145 0.253
Listed target and Private acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Regulatory Episodet−1 0.00732 0.00729 0.0169 0.0254 0.0265 0.0434
(0.036) (0.039) (0.048) (0.056) (0.073) (0.088)
EF Index (centered) 0.0256 0.0464 0.0256 0.0464 0.0256 0.0464
(0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051)
Regulatory Episodet−1 x EF Index (centered) -0.0121 -0.0228 -0.0121 -0.0228 -0.0121 -0.0228
(0.040) (0.049) (0.040) (0.049) (0.040) (0.049)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-squared 0.255 0.325 0.255 0.325 0 .255 0.325
This table presents the placebo test of the effect that a sudden reduction in the
level of EF within a country has on the percentage of M&A transactions between
private acquirers and listed targets, and between listed acquirers and private targets.
Regulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was a reduction of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF in a certain
country. In columns [1] and [2] the index of EF is centered at its mean value to
give meaning to the coefficient of Regulatory Episodet−1. In columns [3] and [4]
the index of EF is centered at its mean value minus one standard deviation. In
columns [5] and [6] the index of EF is centered at its mean value minus two standard
deviations. The dependent variable is the percentage of transactions in a country-year
between private acquirers and listed targets. All specifications include the following
macroeconomic control variables lagged by one year: GDP per capita growth, level of
GDP per capita, domestic credit to private sector, interest rate spread (lending rate
minus deposit rate), log of exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, and trade as
a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the target firm’s country level
and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.13: Placebo Test - The Effect of a Sudden Increase in the Level of Economic
Freedom
Listed target and Private acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 0.0106 0.0236 -0.000315 0.00473 -0.0112 -0.0141
(0.035) (0.038) (0.081) (0.079) (0.140) (0.134)
EF Index (centered) 0.0257 0.0476 0.0257 0.0476 0.0257 0.0476
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049)
Deregulatory Episodet−1 x EF Index (centered) 0.0137 0.0238 0.0137 0.0238 0.0137 0.0238
(0.078) (0.073) (0.078) (0.073) (0.078) (0.073)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-squared 0.256 0.326 0.256 0.326 0.256 0.326
Private target and Listed acquirer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Mean - 1 SD Mean - 2 SD
Deregulatory Episodet−1 -0.0102 -0.00469 -0.0125 -0.00862 -0.0148 -0.0126
(0.032) (0.035) (0.063) (0.066) (0.099) (0.102)
EF Index (centered) -0.0303 -0.0343 -0.0303 -0.0343 -0.0303 -0.0343
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028)
Deregulatory Episodet−1 x EF Index (centered) 0.00291 0.00496 0.00291 0.00496 0.00291 0.00496
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-squared 0.145 0.253 0.145 0.253 0.145 0.253
This table presents the placebo test of the effect that a sudden increase in the level
of EF within a country has on the percentage of M&A transactions between pri-
vate acquirers and listed targets, and between listed acquirers and private targets.
Deregulatory Episodet−1 is an indicator equal to one if, in the previous year, there
was an increase of at least one standard deviation in the level of EF . In columns [1]
and [2] the index of EF is centered at its mean value to give meaning to the coeffi-
cient of Deregulatory Episodet−1. In columns [3] and [4] the index of EF is centered
at its mean value minus one standard deviation. In columns [5] and [6] the index
of EF is centered at its mean value minus two standard deviations. The dependent
variable is the percentage of transactions in a country-year between private acquirers
and listed targets. All specifications include the following macroeconomic control
variables lagged by one year: GDP per capita growth, level of GDP per capita, do-
mestic credit to private sector, interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate),
log of exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, and trade as a percentage of GDP.
Standard errors are clustered at the target firm’s country level and are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
68
Chapter 3
Depositors’ Attention and Bank Risk
Evidence from UK Offshore Accounts
3.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental issues in banking is that deposit insurance deters bank
runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), but reduces depositors’ incentives to pay attention
to banks’ risk (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). This undermines market discipline, creat-
ing moral hazard and the need for tight bank regulation. Despite the importance of
understanding the link between deposit insurance, depositors’ attention, and market
discipline, existing empirical evidence is scarce. This might be due to two challenges.
First, measuring depositors’ attention to bank risk is difficult in the absence of obvi-
ous proxies. To our knowledge, no study to date has attempted to directly measure
depositors’ attention. Second, identifying the effect of deposit insurance is difficult,
absent an ideal set-up where identical products subject to the exact same bank risk
have a different insurance coverage.
In this paper, we propose two main innovations to overcome these issues. First,
we explore a direct measure of retail depositor attention – the frequency at which a
given bank name is searched for in Google over time. This proxy builds up on Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2011, who show that Google search frequencies for listed United
States (US) companies’ tickers proxies for retail stock market investors’ attention.
We match this measure with a new weekly dataset of deposit rates on 41,588 deposit
products offered by 240 UK banks from 2007 to 2015. Since differently risky banks
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offer exactly similar products, we can investigate how bank risk affects deposit rates
while controlling for deposit demand via product-time fixed effects.
To address the second issue, we exploit a peculiarity of the UK banking system.
In our data, a large number of banks offer the same deposit product in both main-
land UK and the Crown Dependencies (Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man). The
Crown Dependencies’ legal and institutional framework is largely similar to that of
UK, and the majority of retail offshore depositors are based in mainland UK. Cru-
cially, however, onshore deposits are insured by the UK’s FSCS, whereas offshore
deposits were not covered at all until late 2008, and only partially so thereafter.1
This allows us to compare how deposit rates on exactly similar products vary with
bank risk depending on deposit insurance, while also holding time-invariant bank and
jurisdiction characteristics constant via bank-jurisdiction fixed effects. Since our data
has rich information on products catering to clienteles with different wealth, we can
control for other potential differences between onshore and offshore depositors like
financial sophistication.
Our first test estimates whether depositors discipline banks by demanding higher
interest rates in response to an increase in banks’ liquidity and solvency risk. Similarly
to research using similar data for the US (Ben-David, Palvia, and Spatt, 2015), we find
no evidence of discipline on average: high-risk banks do not pay higher rates. We then
investigate how discipline varies across jurisdictions with different deposit insurance.
Our results suggest that discipline works in jurisdictions without deposit insurance.
After an increase in bank liquidity risk, offshore deposit rates increase, but onshore
rates do not react. This results are in stark contrast with evidence that market
discipline operates even in the presence of deposit insurance in Argentina (Calomiris
1After the financial crisis, the three Crown Dependencies implemented a compensation scheme.
However, the maximum liability of the scheme makes it insufficient to cover potential losses. More
detail is included in Section 3.2.
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and Powell, 2001)2, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler,
2001), as well as in countries where insurance schemes might be considered more
credible, like the United States and the European Union (Berger and Turk-Ariss,
2015). A key advantage of our study over previous ones is that the granularity of our
database allows us to trace the interest rate paid for each particular product, instead
of using aggregate measures which might be affected by changes in the composition
of deposit types.
One potential concern with our empirical design is that onshore and offshore
depositors might be inherently different. In this case, our results could respond to
differences in depositors’ types and not to the protection provided by the deposit
insurance scheme. In particular, offshore depositors might be more sophisticated
than depositors with onshore accounts, therefore the former discipline banks while
the latter do not. To rule out this alternative explanation more formally, we focus
on deposit accounts with a minimum deposit amount between £25,000 and £50,000.
Offshore depositors with accounts in that tier are hardly sophisticated investors, but
individuals that for personal reasons that do not affect our study -such as having
temporarily worked abroad at some point- had to open offshore accounts.3
Although consistent with theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, the
absence of discipline in mainland UK is surprising since onshore depositors should
incur a loss in case of a bank failure. Until October 2007, the FSCS repaid all of the
first £2,000 in a customer’s account, but only 90% of the next £33,000 – equivalent
to a 9.5% pecuniary loss for a deposit of just within the maximum insured amount
(£35,000). In addition, delays in insurance payouts would impose liquidity costs.
This risk received substantial media coverage during the peak of the financial crisis.
Four days after the run on Northern Rock – the first bank run in the UK since 1878 –
2It must be noted that during a brief subperiod in their analysis, Argentina had no explicit
deposit insurance scheme.
3We provide more information on this topic in Section 3.2.
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the Financial Times reported that “the FSCS admits that compensation claims can
take more than six months to process.”4
To better understand why onshore depositors do not monitor and discipline their
banks despite of the cost of a run, we borrow from the literature on limited atten-
tion. The main argument against deposit insurance is that it deters monitoring by
eliminating incentives. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been
a direct empirical test of this hypothesis, making ours the first attempt in this di-
rection. To test this potential mediation effect, we follow Da, Engelberg, and Gao,
2011 and proxy depositors attention by looking at the frequency at which the name
of each bank is searched on Google.
Our findings support the notion that attention changes market discipline, and
that the strength of this effect depends on deposit insurance. When attention is
low, banks do not increase deposit rates when they take on higher liquidity risk. In
contrast, they do so when attention is high. This effect is significant for both onshore
and offshore deposits. In other words, attention leads to market discipline even when
deposit insurance is available. However, this effect is stronger for offshore deposits,
suggesting that the lack of insurance exacerbates the effect of attention on discipline.
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it tests the effect
of deposit insurance on market discipline in a setting where a bank offers the same
deposit product in two locations with similar institutional frameworks, but different
deposit insurance. This approach contrasts with a large literature using cross-country
comparisons to answer a similar question (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). The conclusions are that deposit insurance can
be destabilising in an environment of limited contract enforceability (Demirgüç-Kunt,
Kane, and Laeven, 2008). One issue is that cross-country comparisons make it hard to
account for confounding differences in jurisdictions’ broader institutional framework.
4Article retrieved from http://on.ft.com/2nJMPDA on March 16th 2016.
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Our within-country setting is similar in spirit to Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016,
who exploit the heterogeneous implementation of deposit insurance across US states
and time. It also adds to papers using one-market settings to study the effect of
deposit insurance on market discipline (Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015; Calomiris and
Powell, 2001; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Park and Peristiani, 1998). One
caveat is that they rely on indirect measures of deposit rates, such as interest expenses
over deposit volume. This makes it hard to disentangle the effect of risk on prices,
quantities, or the composition of deposits. The granularity of our dataset allows us
to track the interest rate paid for each deposit product across time and isolate the
impact of risk on prices.
The paper closest to ours is Ben-David, Palvia, and Spatt, 2015. Using branch-
level deposit rates, they find that rates reflect banks’ investment opportunities and
not their solvency risk; they conclude that discipline does not affect deposit rates.
However, they do not separate insured and uninsured deposits. The unique setting
associated with Crown Dependencies deposits allows us to improve on that point. A
second difference is that we study both solvency and liquidity risk. This approach
leads us to different conclusions.
Our second contribution is to provide the first direct test of the relationship be-
tween retail depositors’ attention, deposit insurance, and market discipline. This
nexus is perhaps one of the most fundamental in banking theory. Since banks engage
in liquidity transformation, they are exposed to runs triggered by coordination fail-
ures (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Preventing indiscriminate runs through deposits
insurance is optimal since runs force banks to sell illiquid loans and bank lending does
not have a perfect substitute. However, insurance also eliminates the disciplining ef-
fect of runs on bank managers (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991), unless insurance premia
perfectly reflects bank risk (Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981; Hovakimian and Kane,
2000). This means that banks debt is cheaper than equity (Diamond and Kashyap,
73
2016), and that insurance must go along with a strict regulation of bank risk-taking.
The higher the share of insured funding, the more severe this moral hazard problem.
Using Google search frequencies to measure retail depositors’ attention allows us
to directly test this hypothesis. This measure has been used in the asset pricing lit-
erature, for instance, to predict stock prices (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011), reveal
market-level sentiment (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2015), and quantify trading behav-
ior (Preis, Moat, and Stanley, 2013). Our approach leads to a striking new result:
even in the presence of deposit insurance, market discipline holds in times of high
attention to bank risk.
Our third contribution is to highlight a novel channel through which liquidity risk
might impact bank lending. The financial crisis has prompted a large literature on
the risks to credit supply associated with wholesale funding. Dagher and Kazimov,
2015 find that during the crisis, US banks relying on wholesale deposits reject more
mortgage loan applications, especially those they cannot liquidate easily. Cornett
et al., 2011 show that US commercial banks relying on wholesale funds hoarded cash
during the crisis instead of supplying credit; Bord and Santos, 2014 show that banks
more prone to liquidity risk via funding guarantees to asset-backed commercial paper
vehicles restrict firms access to credit lines once the commercial paper market dries
up. Aiyar, 2012 shows that UK banks experiencing a drop in foreign funding –
most probably wholesale – cut lending in the UK. These papers do not investigate
the precise channel that links disruptions to wholesale funding to lending cuts. Our
paper is the first to show that exposure to liquidity risk through wholesale funding
increases the retail funding costs of risky banks.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the insti-
tutional setting where our study takes place. Section 3.3 tests whether depositors
discipline banks and the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline. Section 3.4





Our study exploits a political relationship that provides us with an almost ideal setting
to test market discipline: that between the UK and its three Crown Dependencies.
The Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey in the English
Channel and the Isle of Man in the Irish Sea, self-governing territories that are not
part of the UK or the European Union (EU), and have their own independent laws,
elections, and representative bodies. These jurisdictions are not represented in the
UK Parliament, and their relationship with the UK is exclusively through the Crown,
since the Queen is the head of state. A map of the region is provided on Figure 3.1.
However, these jurisdictions have legal systems that are based on the principles
of English common law, their currencies are in parity with the pound sterling, their
inhabitants are British citizens, and their institutions are closely related to the British
ones. These similarities allow us to compare the interest rates paid by the same
bank, for the same product, under two comparable institutional backgrounds, with
the difference that in one jurisdiction the deposits are insured and in the other ones
they are not.
3.2.2 The Financial System in the UK and in the Crown
Dependencies
The financial system in the UK is one of the largest relative to the size of its national
economy. By 2014, financial assets owned by banks and other financial institutions
in the UK amounted to £20 trillion, approximately twelve times the size of UK’s
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GDP.5 In contrast, in other developed countries such as the US, France, or Japan,
the relative size of the financial system is between five and seven times the size of
each country’s GDP (Burrows, Low, and Cumming, 2015).
The financial system includes institutions classified as banks, building societies,
and non-banks. Building societies are similar to savings and loan institutions in
the US, and they -as banks do- offer banking and other financial services to their
members.6 In the non-bank category, we find insurance companies, pension funds,
hedge funds, exchange-traded funds, unit trusts, among others. Excluding financial
derivatives, banks hold approximately 61% of the financial assets in the system.
As of February 2017, there were more than three hundred banks and forty build-
ing societies licensed to operate in the UK. Among banks, half of them (156) are
incorporated in the UK, while the remainder are either incorporated in the Euro-
pean Economic Area (77) or outside of it (79), and are authorized to accept deposits
through a branch in the UK. In contrast, all the building societies are incorporated
in the UK.
Many of these banks and building societies have offshore operations, in the Crown
Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. According to the Isle of Man
Financial Supervision Commission’s Annual Report 2006-2007, by 2007 there were
47 banks and building societies operating in the Isle of Man, out of which 30 were
UK-based banks. In total, banks held £59.2 billion in deposits, out of which £50.1
billion were deposits made by retail customers,7 with the main source of non-banks
deposits being the UK. In Jersey, by 2007 there were 48 banks -17 of them UK-
5This number includes financial derivatives. Excluding financial derivatives, the size of the
financial system is approximately £13 trillion.
6For brevity, in the remainder of the paper we will refer to both banks and building societies as
banks.
7This category is in opposition to deposits made by other banks, building societies, public sector
bodies, and securities.
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based-, with total deposits of £212.3 billion.8 Meanwhile, in Guernsey total deposits
amounted to £119.1 billion, out of which £92.7 were deposits made by individuals
and companies. By 2007, there were 47 licensed banks operating in Guernsey, out
of which 18 were UK-based. These numbers suggest that the financial system in
the Crown Dependencies is heavily related to UK-based banks and UK-based retail
depositors, providing us a proper setting for our study.
3.2.3 Deposit Insurance
3.2.3.1 Deposit Insurance in the UK
Deposit insurance was not implemented in the UK until 1979, when it was included
in the Banking Act in response to the European Economic Community Directive
77/780/EEC and the Secondary Banking crisis in the early 1970s. Initially, the
insurance covered 75% of the deposited amount, for deposits up to £10,000, and with
maturities up to five years. In 1987, the limit was increased to £20,000, with the
percentage covered unaltered. A further revision in 1995 extended the coverage to
protect 90% of eligible deposits.
The current scheme -the FSCS- was implemented in 2001, increasing the com-
pensation limit from £18,000 (90% of £20,000) to £31,700.9 In the following years,
the limits were modified frequently, typically as a response to extraordinary circum-
stances. The maximum deposit amount protected was revised upwards three times
during the crisis, raising the total amount payable per person from £31,700 to £85,000
in 2010. The historical limits are summarized in Table 3.1.
Protection offered by the FSCS is per UK deposit taking licence, and not per
account or bank. This means that a depositor with two different bank accounts in
two different banks can have protection for up to £170,000, depending on whether
8The regulator does not disaggregate deposits among type of depositors.
9The first £2,000 were fully guaranteed by the FSCS, and then 90% of the next £33,000.
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the banks operate under two different licenses. For instance, if a depositor has a
bank account with the Bank of Scotland and another one with Halifax, the insurance
would cover up to £85,000, since both banks operate under the same license (Bank
of Scotland plc). However, if the bank accounts are with the Bank of Scotland and
Barclays, the insurance would cover up to £170,000, since both banks operate under
different licenses (Bank of Scotland plc and Barclays Bank plc).
Since its inception, the FSCS has paid more than £26 billion in compensation
to more than four million people, and played a key role when several banks failed
during the financial crisis (Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley plc, Heritable Bank
plc, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Limited, Landsbanki Islands hf, and London
Scottish Bank plc).
3.2.3.2 Deposit Insurance in the Crown Dependencies
It was not until the financial crisis that regulators in the crown dependencies of
Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man implemented a deposit insurance scheme. In
this section, we provide a brief description of each one of them.
Guernsey Regulators in Guernsey were the first ones to implement a deposit com-
pensation scheme, launched on November 26th of 2008. The insurance provides com-
pensation of up to £50,000 per qualifying deposit per bank, and it is run by an
independent statutory board. The maximum liability of the scheme is capped at
£100 million in any five year period.10
Jersey Following Guernsey’s lead, the Jersey Bank Depositors Compensation
Board launched, on November 6th of 2009, the Depositors Compensation Scheme.
With similar characteristics to that of Guernsey, it provides protection of up to
10www.dcs.gg/about-the-scheme
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£50,000 per person per banking group, with a cap on the maximum liability of the
scheme of £100 million in any five year period.11
Isle of Man About a year later, the Isle of Man put in place a deposit insurance
scheme, in operation since October 23rd of 2010. It offers protection limits similar
to those of Guernsey and Jersey. The regulation does not mention a cap on the
maximum liability of the scheme, but it notes that “...in the event of a very large
covered bank failing, or in a systemic crisis, the Deposit Compensation Scheme is
unlikely to be in a position to provide the full amount of compensation due to you
in a timely manner.” In addition, on the main page it is mentioned that “Deposit
compensation schemes in the UK, Ireland or elsewhere do not cover deposits with
banks or building societies in the Isle of Man”.12
A common characteristic among the schemes in the Crown Dependencies is that
all of them seem to be insufficient to cover potential losses in case of a bank failure.
Despite a significant downsize after the financial crisis, by 2016 there were more
than £18 billion in retail deposits and £43.2 billion in total deposits at 22 licensed
deposit-taker banks in the Isle of Man, according to the Isle of Man Financial Services
Authority. In Guernsey, by 2015 there were £39 billion in retail deposits and £105
billion in total liabilities across 29 banks. In Jersey, by 2014 there were 26 banking
institutions that had a total value of deposits exceeding £130 billion. Therefore,
despite having a deposit insurance scheme in place, a maximum liability of £100
million in any five year period seems to be insufficient to insure depositors.
For our study, there are two characteristics of the banking system and the deposit
insurance scheme in the Crown Dependencies that are crucial. First, that the deposit
insurance scheme in the UK does not cover depositors in these three jurisdictions.




meaning that depositors into both banking systems may be compared. A potential
concern is that depositors in the Crown Dependencies might be more sophisticated
than depositors in the UK. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not the case.13 In
addition, we empirically address this concern. More detail is provided in the next
section.
3.3 Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance
In this section, we test whether depositors discipline banks and how deposit insur-
ance affects this stabilizing mechanism. More specifically, we study the relationship
between the riskiness of a bank and the interest rate it has to pay to attract deposits.
In addition, we study how deposit insurance affects this relationship. We find that
only uninsured depositors discipline banks, meaning that they require compensation
for the risk the bank takes. In addition, we show that systemic risk does not seem to
increase awareness and strengthen the effect.
3.3.1 Data and Methodology
3.3.1.1 Data
We use three datasets for this section. The first dataset is a novel database of deposit
products offered by UK-based banks in the UK and in the Crown Dependencies.
This data is collected weekly by the Moneyfacts Group and published on its monthly
Moneyfacts Magazine. It was first published in 1988 as a brief fact sheet providing
information on personal finance products to allow for comparison. We obtained data
on more than 41,588 deposit products offered by 240 different banks between January
13An article published in The Guardian in October 2008 focuses on this issue. It states “Mention
offshore accounts and many people think of wealthy expats, tax evaders and millionaire “non-doms”.
The article then provides numerous evidence showing that depositors in the Isle of Man were UK
citizens that at some point in their lives lived abroad and had to close their UK accounts.
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2007 and August 2015, describing each product’s characteristics and the interest
rate paid at each point in time. For each product, we have information on the
bank offering the product, the rate type, the frequency of payment, the term, the
notice requirement, whether the account provides credit card, among several other
characteristics. Table 3.2 shows an excerpt of the data, and in Figure 3.2 we plot the
evolution of the mean rate for onshore and offshore products, in addition to the Bank
of England’s Bank Rate.
To trace the interest rate paid for a product across time and to compare prod-
ucts with similar characteristics offered by different banks, we identify and categorize
accounts according to their features. We consider the account type, rate type, fre-
quency of payment of interests, term, notice, and whether the account provides service
through a branch. A summary of the data is provided on Table 3.3. Our final sample
includes 476 categories of products. For illustration purposes, in Table 3.4 we provide
an example of several products that are grouped into the same category.
In addition, to test whether depositors discipline banks, it is necessary to under-
stand the risk a depositor bears. For instance, an individual with a deposit account at
the Bank of Scotland is ultimately exposed to the default risk of the Lloyds Banking
Group, the owner of the Bank of Scotland and the licence under which the Bank of
Scotland operates. To this end, we use our second dataset, the Who Owns Whom
database -also provided by the Moneyfacts Group-, and identify, at each point in
time, the ultimate owner of each bank offering deposit products. We identify 106
different license owners for the banks in our database.
Last, to construct a measure of risk for each license owner at each point in time,
we use regulatory data provided by the Bank of England for each bank operating
under its authorization and supervision. We use information on the balance sheet
and income statement, provided quarterly by each bank. In addition, we use detailed
complementary information collected by the Bank of England to construct our control
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variables, such as the concentration of loan portfolios.
Since regulatory data is provided quarterly, we aggregate the interest rates data
at the product-bank-quarter level. Thus, our final dataset is a quarterly panel that
includes information on products offered by a bank and a series of financial ratios for
each bank.
3.3.1.2 Methodology
Market Discipline We start by testing whether depositors discipline banks on
average. For this, we analyze the relationship between the interest rate paid by a bank
to attract deposits and the stability of the bank. To measure stability, we categorize
deposits according to their stickiness; deposits by individuals are less prone to flight
than wholesale funding, therefore a higher ratio of deposits by individuals to total
assets reflects a lower liquidity risk, i.e. a higher level of stability. For robustness, we
use different measures of liquidity risk: (i) time and sight deposits by individuals over
total assets, (ii) time deposits by non-financial sources over total assets, (iii) time and
sight deposits by non-financial sources over total assets, (iv) time and sight deposits
plus certificates of deposits over total assets, and (v) time and sight deposits plus
certificates of deposits and paper by non-financial sources over total assets. We also
include in our specification a measure of solvency, calculated as the ratio of capital
to total assets.
Our first empirical specification is the following:
Ratei,p,j,t = βs×Solvencyi,t−1+βl×Stabilityi,t−1+γ ψi,t−1+ δp,t+ δi,j + ϵi,p,j,t (3.1)
where i identifies the bank offering the product, p identifies the category of the
product being offered, j is the jurisdiction where the product is being offered, and t
indicates time, measured in quarters.
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The explained variable is the interest rate paid by institution i for a deposit
product p in jurisdiction j at time t. The explanatory variables are our measures
of solvency and stability and the vector ψ, that includes control variables that the
literature indicates are relevant determining interest rates. We follow the CAMEL ap-
proach and include the following controls: Capital Adequacy (Capital to Assets ratio,
our measure of solvency), Assets Quality (Provisions over Assets and Concentration
of Loan Portfolios), Management Capability (Assets Growth), Earnings (Return on
Assets), and Liquidity (Cash to Assets). This data is constructed using regulatory
filings.
In addition, two sets of fixed effects are included: product-time (δp,t) and bank-
jurisdiction (δi,j) fixed effects. The former controls for changes in product demand
over time, product specific characteristics, and time shocks. For instance, if depos-
itors are concerned for liquidity, they might demand products with shorter terms,
therefore the interest rates paid for those products would decrease. The latter fixed
effect controls for differences in banks’ branding strength, the focus that each bank
gives to their offshore banking business, and other unobservable factors such as the
characteristics of the bank-location clientele. The standard errors are clustered at
the parent bank level.
The coefficient of interest is βl, which measures the relationship between the sta-
bility of the bank and the rate the bank pays to attract or retain deposits, while βs
reflects whether the level of capitalization of a bank affects interest rates.
Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline We then test whether deposit in-
surance affects market discipline. To this end, we exploit a peculiarity of the UK
banking system, in which the same bank can offer deposits onshore (mainland UK)
and offshore (the Crown Dependencies). For instance, banks such as Barclays, Abbey
National, Alliance & Leicester, the Bank of Scotland, The Co-operative Bank, HSBC,
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Lloyds, Nationwide, The Royal Bank of Scotland, among others, have branches or
subsidiaries in the Isle of Man and offer the same products that they offer in their UK
branches. Since i) onshore deposits are insured, while offshore deposits are not, and
ii) the institutional setting is similar across jurisdictions, the analysis of the differen-
tial response of the rates paid across jurisdictions to changes in the stability of the
bank provides us a direct test of the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline.
A key advantage of our setting is that depositors in a bank are subject to the
same ultimate risk, regardless of the jurisdiction where their accounts are held. For
instance, account holders at Northern Rock in the UK and in Guernsey were subject
to the risk of default of Northern Rock. Once Northern Rock suffered a run, the
FSCS insured depositors in the UK, while those with accounts at Northern Rock
(Guernsey) Limited suffered important losses.
If deposit insurance deters market discipline we should find that, after an increase
in the riskiness of a a bank, interest rates paid by this bank should increase for offshore
depositors, but not for onshore depositors. To test this hypothesis, we modify our
previous specification by including an indicator (Offshore) that is set to one when the
product is offered in the Isle of Man, Jersey, or Guernsey, and set to zero when the
product is offered in the UK. After interacting our indicator with our Solvency and
Stability measures, our empirical specification is as follows:
Ratei,p,j,t = βs × Solvencyi,t−1 + βos×Offshore×Solvencyi,t−1+
+ βl × Stabilityi,t−1 + βol×Offshore×Stabilityi,t−1 + γ ψi,t−1 + δp,t + δi,j + ϵi,p,j,t
(3.2)
The coefficient of interest is βol, which indicates whether offshore depositors dis-
cipline a bank differently than onshore depositors. If deposit insurance affects the
disciplining mechanism, we should expect βol to be negative. More stability should
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be reflected in a lower interest rate. If deposit insurance does not affect disciplining,
we should expect βol to be zero.
For our results to respond to deposit insurance, we have to assume that there are
no other factors that affect onshore and offshore depositors differently. For instance, if
offshore depositors are more sophisticated than offshore depositors per se, it could be
that a significant coefficient βol captures sophistication and not the effect of deposit
insurance. To rule out this explanation, we focus on products with deposit amounts
in the range of £25,000, which would make the level of wealth and sophistication
of depositors across jurisdictions comparable. In additional analysis, we focus on
different tiers. Results are provided in the next section.
3.3.2 Results
In this section we present the results of the analysis of the relationship between
risk and interest rates, and how deposit insurance affects this relationship. We find
that (i) liquidity risk is not priced on average, (ii) risk pricing does not depend on
systemic risk, (iii) risk pricing does depend on the availability of deposit insurance,
(iv) risk pricing in the absence of deposit insurance does not depend on depositors’
sophistication, and that (v) risk pricing in the absence of deposit insurance does not
depend on systemic risk.
3.3.2.1 Pricing of Liquidity Risk
We start by testing whether liquidity risk is priced, on average. To this end, we run
specification (3.1) on the entire dataset, without distinction of the jurisdiction where
the deposit account is offered. The results of this regression specification are presented
in Table 3.5, where on each column we include one of our five different measures of
liquidity stability. The coefficient on solvency shows that, consistent with Ben-David,
Palvia, and Spatt, 2015, better capitalized banks pay higher rates. In contrast, none
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of the coefficients on our measures of liquidity stability is significant, suggesting that
liquidity risk is not priced, at least on average.
3.3.2.2 Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Systemic Risk
It could be argued that depositors only discipline banks in times of stress, where
the risk of a systemic crisis is higher. In this scenario, public awareness of risk is
higher, leading to market discipline (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). To test
this hypothesis, we analyze whether the results differ during the financial crisis. We
create an indicator that is set to one for observations in the period between September
2007 and November 2008 and interact this variable with our solvency and liquidity
risk measures. The results in Table 3.6 suggest that depositors do not discriminate
more between banks when systemic risk is high than when it is not.
3.3.2.3 Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Deposit Insurance
To test whether deposit insurance affects how depositors discipline banks, we run
specification (3.2), where we include an indicator for offshore accounts and interact it
with our measures of risk. The coefficient on our measures of liquidity stability in Ta-
ble 3.7 are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, suggesting that onshore
(insured) depositors do not discipline banks. However, the coefficient on the interac-
tion term between the offshore indicator and our measures of liquidity risk shows that
offshore depositors do discipline banks, i.e. they demand a lower compensation for
their deposits the more stable the bank is. The results are statistically significant and
large in magnitude across four out of our five specifications. A coefficient of -1.636
(first column) indicates that an increase of ten percentage points in the ratio of time
and sight deposits over total assets would reduce the rate paid for offshore deposits
by 16 basis points, a reduction of 8% over a rate with mean of 2%.
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3.3.2.4 Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Sophistication
The next step is to understand whether our results are driven by sophistication and
not bu the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. Despite the anecdotal evidence
presented in the article published by The Guardian and our focus on the £25,000 tier,
an empirical test is required to rule out this alternative explanation. We run our main
specification on deposit accounts of different tiers -£5,000, £50,000, and £100,000-
to proxy for sophistication or financial education. If it is sophistication -and not re-
liance on deposit insurance- what drives our results, we should find that sophisticated
onshore depositors also discipline banks, while non-sophisticated offshore depositors
do not. The coefficients on our measures of liquidity stability in Tables 3.8, 3.9,
and 3.10 show that banks do not compensate onshore depositors regardless of their
wealth level. However, the coefficients on the interaction term between the indicator
for offshore accounts and our measures of liquidity stability are negative and statis-
tically significant regardless of the wealth level, meaning that banks do compensate
offshore depositors. These results suggest that the driver of market discipline is not
sophistication but deposit insurance.
3.3.2.5 Pricing of Liquidity Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Systemic Risk
Last, we test whether the pricing of liquidity risk in jurisdictions with no deposit
insurance scheme depends on systemic risk. We run a modified specification 3.2, and
interact our measure of liquidity stability with the indicator for offshore accounts and
our indicator for financial crisis periods. The coefficient on the triple interaction term
in Table 3.11 is small in magnitude and insignificant for all of our measures of liquidity
stability, suggesting that systemic risk does not affect disciplining in jurisdictions with
no deposit insurance scheme.
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3.4 Limited Attention
The previous section shows that only depositors that are not covered by a deposit
insurance scheme discipline banks. Although consistent with theoretical model pre-
dictions, this result is surprising given that a bank run might be costly even for
insured depositors. If compensation is not immediate, a ban run would cause a liq-
uidity shock to depositors. In the UK, the first time in over a century that depositors
had to seek compensation from the FSCS, it proved to be non-immediate. Four days
after the run on Northern Rock, the Financial Times published an article where it
reported that “...the FSCS admits that compensation claims can take more than six
months to process”.14
To understand why insured depositors do not discipline banks, we borrow from
the literature on limited attention. The main argument against deposit insurance is
that it deters monitoring by depositors, by eliminating incentives to do so. In this
section, we directly test the relationship between deposit insurance, attention, and
market discipline. To this end, we follow Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011 and proxy
depositors attention by looking at the frequency at which the name of each bank is
searched on Google.
3.4.1 Data and Methodology
3.4.1.1 Data
In this section, we include a fourth dataset to our study, the Google Trends database.
Through this tool, Google provides an index of the volume of searches for a particular
term or a combination of terms. To familiarize the reader with the data, we plot
the search frequency for three different terms over time: “Trump”, “Brexit”, and
“Influenza”. Figure 3.3 shows that the search for the term “Trump” peaked the week
14Article retrieved from http://on.ft.com/2nJMPDA on March 16th 2016.
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of the presidential election in November of 2016, where Donald Trump ran as the
Republican candidate. The search for the term “Brexit” peaked during the week of
June 23rd 2016, when the UK held its European Union membership referendum. In
contrast, the term “Influenza” exhibits a seasonal pattern, as expected. Every winter,
the term is searched for much more frequently than in the other seasons.
As the examples provided show, this index measures the active search for infor-
mation, in contrast to other measures used in the literature such as the number of
news articles that mention a bank over a specific time frame. The advantage that the
index we use provides is that, as Barber and Odean, 2008 claim, the release of news
or information is not an indicator of how many people read the news. In contrast,
the active search for information is a good proxy for the salience of information.
We obtain the Google Trends data for each bank in our database, from 2007
until 2015. To retrieve data that reflects the search for information on each bank
and building society, we focus on terms that unambiguously refer to the bank. For
instance, we retrieve search information for “Derbyshire Building Society” and not
for “Derbyshire”, since the latter might reflect interest in the county and not on the
bank. The tool provides weekly data, unless the search volume is low, in which case
it provides monthly data.
To take advantage of the higher frequency of the attention data, in this section
we use interest rates information at the weekly frequency, and construct a panel at
the product-bank-week level that includes information on the interest rate paid for
a product by a bank each week, merged with financial information for the bank the
previous quarter and information on the search frequency for the name of the bank
over the last weeks.
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3.4.1.2 Methodology
The index that we use provides a measure of the frequency at which a term is searched
for in Google, normalized by the historical maximum. For each bank, we obtain a
weekly time series that traces search volume in the UK, and following Da, Engelberg,
and Gao, 2011 we construct a weekly measure of abnormal attention for bank i at
time t as the log of the frequency at which the name of the bank is searched for
on that week, minus the log of the median search frequency for that bank over the
previous four weeks.
AbnAttentioni,t = log(frequencyi,t)− log(median freqi,[t−1w,...,t−4w])
An example supporting the suitability of our measure is that of Northern Rock,
the bank that suffered a run in 2007. A peculiarity of Northern Rock was that it
relied heavily on wholesale funding. On August 9th 2007, short term funding froze,
and a few days later -on August 13th- the bank informed the regulator about the
funding problems. It was not until September 14th -a month later- that the Bank of
England provided funding for the bank and announced its support publicly, triggering
a bank run. Figure 3.4 plots our measure of abnormal attention for Northern Rock
and shows that it accurately traces the events.
We include four lagged weekly values of our measure of attention as regressors and
interact them with our measures of solvency and stability, and with our indicator for
90








βsn × Solvencyi,t−1 × AbnAtti,t−nw +
4∑
n=1
βln × Stabilityi,t−1 × AbnAtti,t−nw+








+ γ ψi,t−1 + δp,t + δi,j + ϵi,p,j,t (3.3)
The coefficients of interest are i) βln, measuring the effect of the interaction be-
tween abnormal attention and stability and indicating whether onshore depositors
discipline banks in times when attention increases, and ii) βoln, measuring the effect
of the triple interaction between abnormal attention, the indicator for offshore ac-
counts, and stability, testing whether offshore depositors discipline banks differently
than onshore depositors in times when attention increases. A negative coefficient βln
would indicate that onshore depositors do discipline banks in times when attention
increases, i.e. when they actively search for information on the bank, and a similar
result for the coefficient βoln would indicate that offshore depositors discipline banks
even more than onshore depositors in times when attention increases.
3.4.2 Results
Our results support the notion that deposit insurance deters monitoring. Due to lim-
ited attention, insured depositors do not actively monitor banks, and therefore they
do not exert discipline over banks in response to increased liquidity risk. However,
when depositors do actively search for information on the bank, they do discipline
banks -both onshore and offshore.
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Table 3.12 shows the results for our analysis. To make the table more compact,
on each column we include a different measure of stability. We find that the co-
efficient βl (Stability) is indistinguishable from zero in all our specifications, while
the coefficient βl1 (Stability ×AbnAttt−1w) is negative and statistically significant for
all of our measures of liquidity risk, meaning that attention moderates disciplining.
We interpret these results to mean that banks do not have to compensate onshore
depositors for increased risk, as long as attention is low. However, when depositors
-potentially in response to news- start looking for information on the bank, the effect
on interest rates is significant.
The response is immediate. A week after receiving attention, banks have to re-
spond by reflecting the riskiness in the interest rate paid to attract deposits. The
sign and significance of the coefficient βol1 show that the effect is even stronger in
offshore accounts. To our surprise, attention seems to trigger discipline after one and
three weeks, but not after two.
Interestingly, more solvent banks can pay lower interest rates offshore, but not
onshore, and attention does not seem to moderate this effect. In addition, our results
suggest that banks that draw attention also have to increase the rates paid. However,
causality could run in the opposite direction. Banks that increase the interest rates
paid draw depositors attention.
3.5 Conclusion
The main criticism against deposit insurance is that it eliminates depositors incentives
to monitor banks, leading to severe moral hazard problems. However, most empirical
studies analyzing the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline suffer from
endogeneity issues, since they exploit cross-country variations or variation across time
within a country, and implementation of a deposit insurance scheme reflects changes
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in economic factors -such as an increase in bank risk-.
In this study, we overcome this problem by exploiting the close to ideal setting
that the relationship between the UK and the Crown Dependencies provides. In
this context, the same bank offers the same product to similar individuals in two
different jurisdictions, one that provides deposit insurance and one that does not.
This allows us to study the relationship between the riskiness of a bank and the
interest rates it has to pay to attract or retain deposits, and how deposit insurance
affects this relationship. To this end, we use a confidential database that provides
the characteristics and the interest rates paid for 41,588 different deposit products
between 2007 and 2015. Thanks to the granularity of the database, we can trace the
rate paid for each particular deposit product across time.
We find evidence of market discipline in jurisdictions with no deposit insurance,
but no effect in jurisdictions with deposit insurance, suggesting that deposit compen-
sation schemes deter discipline. Thus, our results contradict those from earlier studies
such as Calomiris and Powell, 2001, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001, Berger and
Turk-Ariss, 2015, and Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016. Although consistent with theo-
retical model predictions, our empirical results are surprising, since in our setting it
does pay to participate in a bank run. In contrast to theoretical models’ assumptions,
in our setting there are liquidity costs faced by depositors in case of a bank run.
To pin down the mechanism preventing market discipline, we turn to the literature
on limited attention. We construct a measure of depositors attention to a bank, and
show that insured depositors do discipline banks in times when attention is high. In
contrast, in times when attention is low, there is no market discipline. Our results
suggest that deposit insurance deters monitoring, which in turn deters discipline.
Our results point out a potential solution to counterbalance the effect of deposit
insurance on market discipline. Consistent with Goldstein and Sapra, 2014, we find
that the disclosure of banks’ stability measures might promote discipline -even in the
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presence of deposit insurance schemes- and reduce moral hazard. By empirically iden-
tifying the relationship between attention, deposit insurance, and market discipline,
we hope to define a direction for future work in this field.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: The Crown Dependencies
This figure shows the location of the three Crown Dependencies: the Isle of Man,
Jersey, and Guernsey.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of Interest Rates
This figure plots the evolution of mean rates for offshore and onshores products, in
addition to the Bank of England’s Bank Rate.
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Figure 3.3: Google Trends Data
This figure plots the search frequency over time for the terms “Trump”, “Brexit”,
and “Influenza”. The graph shows that the search for the term “Trump” peaked the
week of the presidential election in November 2016, where Donald Trump ran as the
Republican candidate. The search for the term “Brexit” peaked during the week of
June 23 2016, when the UK held its European Union membership referendum. The
term “Influenza” exhibits a seasonal pattern, as expected. Every winter, the term is
searched for much more frequently than in the other seasons.
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Figure 3.4: Abnormal Attention - Northern Rock
This figure plots our measure of abnormal attention for Northern Rock, the first
bank in the UK to suffer a run in more than a century. On August 9 2007 (first
vertical line), short term funding froze, and a few days later -on August 13- the bank
informed the regulator about the funding problems. It was not until September 14
(second vertical line) that the Bank of England provided funding for the bank and
announced publicly its support, triggering a bank run.
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Table 3.1: FSCS Historical Compensation Limits
Date Deposit Limit Coverage Maximum FSCS payout
Jul-82 £10,000 75% £7,500
May-87 £20,000 75% £15,000
Jul-95 £20,000 90% £18,000
Dec-01 £35,000 100% of first £2,000,
90% of the following £33,000
£31,700
Oct-07 £35,000 100% £35,000
Oct-08 £50,000 100% £50,000
Dec-10 £85,000 100% £85,000
Jul-15 £75,000 100% £75,000
Jan-17 £85,000 100% £85,000
This table summarizes the characteristics of the deposit insurance scheme (limit,
percentage covered, and maximum payout) available in the UK from its inception
until early 2017.
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Table 3.2: MoneyFacts Data Excerpt
File Date 2/1/2007 2/1/2007 2/1/2007 2/1/2007 2/1/2007

















Interest Paid Yearly Yearly Yearly Anniversary Monthly
Rate Type Variable Variable Variable Variable Variable
Notice Instant Instant Instant 50 Day 50 Day
Term 0 0 0 0 0
Rate 1k 3.1 5.4 5.2 4.28 4.19
Rate 5k 3.6 5.4 5.2 4.48 4.39
Rate 10k 4.1 5.4 4.72 4.62
Rate 25k 4.1 4.77 4.66
Rate 50k 4.1 4.82 4.71
Rate 100k 4.1 4.82 4.71
Rate 125k 4.82 4.71
Rate 150k 4.82 4.71
Min Operate Balance 100 5 25 1 1
Minimum Investment 100 5 25 1 1
Withdrawal Allowed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Early Access No No No Yes Yes
Operate Branch Yes Yes Yes No No
Operate Telephone No No No Yes Yes
Operate Post Yes Yes Yes No No
Operate Internet No No No Yes Yes
Passbook Yes Yes Yes No No
Cash Card No No No No No
Debit Card No No No No No
Chq Book No No No No No
Max Age 20 Years 15 Years 17 Years 16 Years 16 Years
This table presents an excerpt of the MoneyFacts database. The information pro-
vided includes the daily rate, the bank offering the deposit product, characteristics of
the product such as the account type, the rate type, notice, term, frequency of pay-
ment of interest, the interest rate paid for deposits in different tiers, and additional
information such as whether the account provides a debit card, among others.
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Regular Savings Childrens 161
Regular Savings ISA 33
Regular Savings Junior ISA 13
Variable 24,242 4,857
Rate type
Fixed Rate 17,173 1,356
Fixed Rate then
Variable Rate 155 23
Variable Rate 33,278 4,811
Interest rate paid




On Closure 3 329
On Maturity 3,775 424
On Maturity





Sight deposit 32,082 4,810
Less than one year 6,215 647
Between one and two years 5,196 320
Between two and three years 3,960 293
Between three and four years 1,400 31




Less than one month 3,082 342
Between one and two months 2,152 422
Between two and three months 2,224 229
Between three and four months 589 205
More than four months 377 109
Full term 8,664 881
Branch Access No 14,252 3,095Yes 36,354 3,095
This table presents a summary of the data aggregated at the quarterly level. For
each characteristic, we provide the number of observations within each jurisdiction
(onshore vs. offshore).
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Table 3.4: Products within a Category - Example
File Date 4/6/2007 4/6/2007 4/6/2007
Account Type Variable Variable Variable
Company Coventry BS Citibank HSBC
Account Name Family 1st
(Saver Account)
Euro Savings Flexible Saver
Interest Paid Monthly Monthly Monthly
Rate Type Variable Variable Variable
Notice Instant Instant Instant
Term 0 0 0
Rate 1k 5.6 0.5 2.91
Rate 5k 5.6 0.5 2.91
Rate 10k 5.6 0.5 3.3
Rate 25k 5.6 0.5 3.3
Rate 50k 5.6 0.5 3.69
Rate 100k 5.6 1 3.69
Rate 125k 5.6 1 3.69
Rate 150k 5.6 1 3.69
Min Operate Balance 1 1 1
Minimum Investment 1 1 1
Withdrawal Allowed Yes Yes Yes
Early Access No No No
Operate Branch Yes Yes Yes
Operate Telephone Yes Yes Yes
Operate Post Yes Yes Yes
Operate Internet Yes Yes Yes
Passbook No No No
Cash Card Yes Yes No
Debit Card No No No
Chq Book No No No
Max Age - - -
In this table, we provide an example of three products that are grouped into the same
category of products. These three products, offered by three different banks, offer
the same type of rate (variable), pay with the same frequency (monthly), and have
similar notice and term conditions (instant and zero days).
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Table 3.5: Pricing of Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Solvency 1.420** 1.353** 1.449** 1.446** 1.396**











Exposure to Real Estate -0.301 -0.419 -0.303 -0.299 -0.276
(0.567) (0.583) (0.569) (0.557) (0.537)
Exposure to Fin. Interm 0.0363 0.0309 0.0516 0.0565 0.0798
(0.261) (0.256) (0.263) (0.260) (0.265)
Exposure to Insurance 4.425 3.602 4.482 4.480 4.418
(4.864) (4.681) (4.874) (4.846) (4.713)
Provisions - Flow -3.972 -3.570 -4.087 -4.075 -4.068
(6.189) (6.306) (6.270) (6.274) (6.257)
Provisions - Stock -6.073* -6.867** -6.090* -6.068* -5.968*
(3.292) (3.409) (3.335) (3.297) (3.171)
Earnings -0.766 -0.821 -0.791 -0.785 -0.758
(0.815) (0.839) (0.799) (0.782) (0.807)
Assets Growth 0.0236 0.0327 0.0219 0.0215 0.0192
(0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Cash to Assets -0.170 -0.184 -0.171 -0.172 -0.186
(0.492) (0.499) (0.495) (0.500) (0.493)
N 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570
R-Squared 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit
product to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. On each column
we use a different measure of stability. We include CAMEL-type controls, and all
specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Systemic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Solvency 1.258** 1.163* 1.286** 1.258** 0.996
(0.615) (0.641) (0.619) (0.622) (0.604)
Crisis * Solvency 1.473 0.813 1.411 1.422 1.779
(1.570) (1.618) (1.609) (1.661) (1.662)
Stability 1 -0.261
(0.400)
















Crisis * Stability 5 1.065*
(0.574)
N 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570
R-Squared 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit prod-
uct to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. On each column we
use a different measure of stability. The crisis indicator is set to one for observations
in the period between September 2007 and November 2008. We include CAMEL-
type controls, and all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Deposit Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Solvency 1.337* 1.330* 1.361* 1.416* 1.369*
(0.754) (0.789) (0.757) (0.764) (0.768)
Offshore * Solvency 0.684 -0.958 0.712 0.237 0.0591
(1.704) (1.442) (1.721) (1.712) (1.719)
Stability 1 0.0612
(0.407)
















Offshore * Stability 5 0.340
(0.862)
N 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570
R-Squared 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit prod-
uct to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. On each column we
use a different measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set to one for products
offered in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. We include CAMEL-type controls,
and all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Sophistication - Deposits in the £5,000 tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 5k Rate 5k Rate 5k Rate 5k Rate 5k
Solvency 1.928*** 2.004*** 1.944*** 1.967*** 1.948***
(0.469) (0.517) (0.472) (0.481) (0.505)
Offshore * Solvency -0.754 -2.379 -0.633 -0.948 -1.236
(2.013) (2.150) (2.009) (2.092) (2.290)
Stability 1 -0.0110
(0.440)
















Offshore * Stability 5 0.515
(0.864)
N 23,832 23,832 23,832 23,832 23,832
R-Squared 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit
product to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. In this table,
we focus on deposit products on the £5,000 tier, to test whether market discipline
depends on sophistication (as proxied by wealth). On each column we use a differ-
ent measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set to one for products offered
in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. We include CAMEL-type controls, and
all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Sophistication - Deposits in the £50,000 tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 50k Rate 50k Rate 50k Rate 50k Rate 50k
Solvency 0.962 0.913 0.986 1.048 0.980
(0.690) (0.715) (0.689) (0.699) (0.707)
Offshore * Solvency 1.635 0.172 1.649 1.207 1.063
(1.627) (1.366) (1.644) (1.627) (1.583)
Stability 1 0.0936
(0.453)
















Offshore * Stability 5 0.244
(0.841)
N 24,552 24,552 24,552 24,552 24,552
R-Squared 0.907 0.908 0.907 0.907 0.907
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit
product to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. In this table,
we focus on deposit products on the £50,000 tier, to test whether market discipline
depends on sophistication (as proxied by wealth). On each column we use a differ-
ent measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set to one for products offered
in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. We include CAMEL-type controls, and
all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Pricing of Liquidity Risk and Sophistication - Deposits in the £100,000
tier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 100k Rate 100k Rate 100k Rate 100k Rate 100k
Solvency 0.846 0.776 0.871 0.939 0.822
(0.719) (0.744) (0.719) (0.726) (0.722)
Offshore * Solvency 2.035 0.689 2.039 1.650 1.631
(1.648) (1.319) (1.673) (1.662) (1.555)
Stability 1 0.127
(0.475)
















Offshore * Stability 5 0.408
(0.861)
N 24,371 24,371 24,371 24,371 24,371
R-Squared 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit
product to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. In this table,
we focus on deposit products on the £100,000 tier, to test whether market discipline
depends on sophistication (as proxied by wealth). On each column we use a differ-
ent measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set to one for products offered
in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. We include CAMEL-type controls, and
all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.11: Pricing of Liquidity Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Systemic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Solvency 1.251* 1.097 1.280* 1.311* 1.043
(0.727) (0.734) (0.734) (0.743) (0.712)
Offshore * Solvency 0.428 -0.347 0.403 0.00296 0.162
(1.845) (1.779) (1.817) (1.790) (1.877)
Crisis * Solvency 2.343 2.651* 2.295 2.352 2.768*
(1.433) (1.544) (1.458) (1.486) (1.439)
Offshore * Crisis * Solvency -4.647 -8.811* -4.699 -5.657 -7.885
(5.276) (4.471) (5.314) (5.640) (6.049)
Stability 1 -0.0266
(0.398)
Offshore * Stability 1 -1.672***
(0.558)
Crisis * Stability 1 0.637
(0.430)




Offshore * Stability 2 -1.340**
(0.654)
Crisis * Stability 2 0.600
(0.964)




Offshore * Stability 3 -1.697***
(0.583)
Crisis * Stability 3 0.628
(0.417)




Offshore * Stability 4 -1.462**
(0.597)
Crisis * Stability 4 0.540
(0.424)
Offshore * Crisis * Stability 4 0.872
(0.780)
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Table 3.11 Continued: Pricing of Liquidity Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Systemic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Stability 5 -0.399
(0.418)
Offshore * Stability 5 -0.187
(0.797)
Crisis * Stability 5 0.762
(0.479)
Offshore * Crisis * Stability 5 1.127
(0.742)
N 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570
R-Squared 0.907 0.908 0.907 0.907 0.908
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit product
to changes in the stability and solvency of that institution. On each column we use a
different measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set to one for products offered
in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man, while the crisis indicator is set to one for
observations in the period between September 2007 and November 2008. We include
CAMEL-type controls, and all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Pricing of Liquidity Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Attention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
Solvency 2.436 2.491* 2.455* 2.428 2.173
(1.454) (1.372) (1.446) (1.459) (1.305)
AbnAttt−1w * Solvency -1.195 -1.670 -1.193 -1.242 -2.109**
(0.795) (1.059) (0.816) (0.843) (0.931)
AbnAttt−2w * Solvency -0.415 -0.562 -0.422 -0.472 -0.727
(0.420) (0.489) (0.423) (0.429) (0.499)
AbnAttt−3w * Solvency -0.551 -0.707 -0.547 -0.593 -1.191*
(0.591) (0.749) (0.600) (0.613) (0.681)
AbnAttt−4w * Solvency -0.654 -0.968 -0.666 -0.738 -1.340
(0.675) (0.794) (0.685) (0.708) (0.851)
Offshore * Solvency -6.262*** -5.649* -5.908*** -5.567*** -5.241***
(1.836) (3.205) (1.799) (1.818) (1.558)
Offshore * AbnAttt−1w * Solvency -3.195 -7.875 -2.889 -2.613 -3.383
(6.146) (4.986) (6.038) (5.847) (5.509)
Offshore * AbnAttt−2w * Solvency -2.961 -2.162 -2.976 -2.818 -3.279
(4.047) (3.666) (3.973) (3.843) (3.970)
Offshore * AbnAttt−3w * Solvency -0.0506 -3.296 0.0696 0.409 0.310
(4.322) (3.996) (4.264) (4.165) (4.194)
Offshore * AbnAttt−4w * Solvency -0.110 -0.295 -0.0472 0.310 0.309
(2.881) (2.926) (2.877) (2.805) (2.929)
Stability i -0.268 -0.360 -0.235 -0.230 -0.606
(0.413) (0.238) (0.397) (0.385) (0.374)
AbnAttt−1w * Stability i -0.610*** -0.638*** -0.607*** -0.645*** -0.966***
(0.173) (0.182) (0.175) (0.190) (0.241)
AbnAttt−2w * Stability i -0.00335 -0.0660 -0.00777 -0.0292 -0.109
(0.050) (0.072) (0.052) (0.059) (0.081)
AbnAttt−3w * Stability i -0.346*** -0.336** -0.346*** -0.375*** -0.588***
(0.084) (0.133) (0.085) (0.094) (0.104)
AbnAttt−4w * Stability i -0.192* -0.277* -0.197* -0.238* -0.508**
(0.104) (0.140) (0.107) (0.119) (0.185)
Offshore * Stability i -1.074 0.773 -1.381 -1.923** -1.358
(1.157) (1.154) (1.047) (0.832) (1.013)
Offshore * AbnAttt−1w * Stability i -1.526*** -2.381*** -1.474*** -1.485*** -1.479***
(0.487) (0.678) (0.477) (0.440) (0.490)
Offshore * AbnAttt−2w * Stability i -0.503 -0.194 -0.501* -0.560* -0.452
(0.300) (0.349) (0.288) (0.298) (0.328)
Offshore * AbnAttt−3w * Stability i -0.311 -1.043*** -0.301 -0.264 -0.123
(0.341) (0.264) (0.340) (0.316) (0.356)
Offshore * AbnAttt−4w * Stability i -0.00638 -0.356 0.0130 0.0331 0.385
(0.280) (0.367) (0.276) (0.287) (0.341)
AbnAttt−1w 0.630*** 0.515*** 0.634*** 0.672*** 1.043***
(0.165) (0.160) (0.170) (0.184) (0.254)
AbnAttt−2w 0.0302 0.0735 0.0340 0.0539 0.141
(0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.078) (0.103)
AbnAttt−3w 0.322*** 0.239** 0.325*** 0.354*** 0.599***
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Table 3.12 Continued: Pricing of Liquidity Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Attention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k Rate 25k
(0.104) (0.110) (0.106) (0.112) (0.131)
AbnAttt−4w 0.195 0.206* 0.201 0.239* 0.519**
(0.122) (0.115) (0.126) (0.136) (0.203)
Offshore * AbnAttt−1w 1.415* 1.764*** 1.380* 1.394* 1.448*
(0.754) (0.476) (0.735) (0.691) (0.716)
Offshore * AbnAttt−2w 0.533 0.279 0.538 0.573 0.541
(0.509) (0.390) (0.500) (0.503) (0.543)
Offshore * AbnAttt−3w 0.296 0.784* 0.286 0.239 0.117
(0.550) (0.418) (0.542) (0.517) (0.569)
Offshore * AbnAttt−4w 0.00385 0.188 -0.0139 -0.0582 -0.346
(0.424) (0.420) (0.420) (0.410) (0.480)
N 202,751 202,751 202,751 202,751 202,751
R-Squared 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the response of the interest rate paid by a bank for a deposit product to
changes in the stability and solvency of that institution and the abnormal attention that the
institution draws, as measured by the frequency at which the name of the bank is searched for
on Google. On each column we use a different measure of stability. The offshore indicator is set
to one for products offered in Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. We include CAMEL-type
controls, and all specifications include product-time and jurisdiction-bank fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the parent bank level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix A - Transfer mispricing mechanism
description
To understand this process in more detail, imagine a company incorporated in the US, with a
subsidiary in Argentina. Prior to the regulation, the profits made in Argentina were transferred to
the headquarters. Faced with currency exchange or money transfer constraints, a company —defying
the regulations— might undertake transfer mispricing, which can take several forms. Among them:
1. Pay a higher price for goods imported from another subsidiary or the headquarters, there-
fore realizing the profits in another country and overcoming the restriction imposed by the
government.
2. Pay a higher price for goods imported from a third party, and then having the third party
deposit the price difference in a foreign account.
3. Export at a low price to another subsidiary of the same company, realizing the profits abroad.
4. Export at a low price to a third party, and then having the third party deposit the price
difference in a foreign account.
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Appendix B - Related Press Articles
Press articles dated November 2014 announcing that the government suspended
P&G’s operations. The article states that “The accusation is that the company over-
billed $138 million in imports to get money out of the country”. The company was
accused of exploiting the transfer mispricing mechanism.
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Press article dated December 2014. The full article states that, “In response, some
foreign firms have fled the country. According to Desarrollo de Negocios Interna-
cionales, a consultancy, 40 foreign companies have left or frozen their operations
since 2011.” More than 70% of the firms listed in the full report are publicly listed
companies.
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Appendix C - A Simple Static Model
In this appendix I present a simple static model to explain why firms might decide to comply with
regulations or to bypass them, and the consequences this decision has. The first takeaway of the
model relates to the compliance rate of the firm, and shows that it is a priori theoretically unclear
whether companies listed on stock exchanges should have a higher compliance rate than private
firms, or vice versa. After incorporating the results obtained in Section 1.2, the model predicts
that if the differential compliance cost is of large magnitude it should shape the pattern of M&A
transactions. This prediction is tested in Section 2.2.
Consider a firm that operates in a business unfriendly-environment with regulations that limit
its normal operations. The firm might choose to comply with regulations, reducing the value of
its operations (e.g. by increasing operational cost) or it might choose to defy them, maintaining
the value of its operations but facing the risk that authorities will discover and sanction the firm.
Consider a firm that imports products to be used as inputs. Certain categories of imported products
might be subject to higher tax rates or stricter inspections than other goods, and would therefore
be cleared more slowly when going through customs. The firm has two options: 1) it can choose to
truthfully declare the category of the product being imported and pay higher taxes, or wait longer
for the product to be cleared, 2) it can choose to declare the product as belonging to a different
category and pay lower taxes, or have it cleared faster. If caught doing this second option, the firm
would be fined or sanctioned.
I define β as the compliance rate of a given firm. A coefficient β = 0 means that the company
does not comply with regulations at all, and therefore they do not affect its operations. However,
the firm risks being caught bypassing regulations. On the other hand, a coefficient β = 1 means
that the company fully complies with regulations, and therefore regulations have full impact on its
operations. However, there is no risk of being fined or suspended.
Following the previous example, the value of the firm can be modeled as the sum of a term
that accounts for the firm’s operative profits, and a term that accounts for the expected cost of
being fined or suspended. I define αi as the inverse of the cost of capital of firm i (or Present Value
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Factor) that discounts future profits, and EF as the level of Economic Freedom of the market where
the firm operates, as described in Section 2.2. Business-unfriendly markets will have low EF , and
business-friendly markets will have high EF . The coefficient pi measures the probability that firm
i is caught bypassing regulations, and the term γ(1 − βi) is the cost the firm pays if it is caught,
which is further explained below. My model of the value of the firm is then
V (firmi) = αi[1− βi(1− EF )]− pi[γ(1− βi)] (C1)
The value of the firm as defined in Equation C1 can be thought of as follows. The first term
measures the value of operations of firm i. The second term measures the expected cost of non-
compliance. In the first term, the parameter αi is the inverse of the cost of capital of firm i and is
used as a discount factor, with a higher cost of capital implying a lower αi. The term βi(1 − EF )
factors in the burden of compliance with regulations. The higher the level of compliance βi and the
more business-unfriendly the market is (lower EF ), the higher the burden of compliance and the
lower the resulting value of operations. Going back to the customs example, the higher the number
of regulations and the higher the compliance rate, the longer the company has to wait to clear inputs
from customs or the higher the taxes it has to pay to import products. In the extreme case in which
the firm does not comply at all with regulations, βi = 0 and regulations do not impose a burden
on operations. In contrast, when the firm fully complies, βi = 1, the more business-unfriendly the
market is, the greater the burden on operations.
The second term in Equation C1 also has two components. The first component is the probability
of getting caught bypassing regulations. The second component is the price the firm pays, conditional
on being caught. The latter has a fixed value (γ) and a factoring term (1 − βi) that implies that,
conditional on being caught, the lower the compliance rate the higher the cost to the firm. 15
The probability of being audited and caught is endogenous and depends on two variables. First,
it depends on the compliance rate of the firm. Intuitively, we might say that ∂p∂β < 0: the lower the
15If the firm is found committing an infraction, it will likely be audited, and other infractions
might be discovered. Thus, the lower the compliance rate, the larger the number of fines it will be
subject to.
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compliance rate, the higher the probability of being caught.16 Second, it depends on the strictness
of the auditing and enforcement standards of the regulator, defined as δi. It is easy to see that
∂p
∂δ > 0: the stricter the standards, the higher the probability of being caught.17 A linear model is
obtained by setting pi = (1− βi)δi. 18
Managers have to choose the compliance rate βi that maximizes the value of the firm. The trade-
off the firm faces is that a high βi reduces the probability of being fined or suspended. However, it
also maximizes the negative impact that regulations have on the value of the firm’s operations. In
contrast, a low βi reduces the impact that regulations have on the firm but increases the probability
of being caught and fined.




αi(1− βi(1− EF ))− γ(1− βi)2δi (C2)
The trade-off the firm faces is seen again in the simplified equation. The compliance rate βi
affects the firm in two ways, one positive and one negative. A higher compliance rate reduces
the operative value of the firm. However, it also reduces the non-compliance cost. The FOC of




varies with the firm-specific coefficients αi and δi. The lower the firm’s cost of capital (higher αi),
the higher the marginal value of each dollar saved bypassing regulations and operating outside the
law, therefore the lower the optimal compliance rate. The stricter the auditing and enforcement
standards under which the firm is monitored (δi), the higher the probability of being caught and
therefore the higher the optimal compliance rate.
16As an analogy, a car with a broken tail light, no side mirror, and no license plate is more likely
to be pulled over by the police than a car with just a broken tail light.
17Revisiting the car analogy, we can assume that being pulled over by a police officer that thor-
oughly checks compliance with laws (rather than by one that does a careless check) increases the
probability of getting a ticket.
18It could be argued that firms are more likely to be caught in more regulated markets. The
inclusion of a term to account for this does not change the model’s main implications.
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Firm type and regulatory environment From the FOC we see that the optimal com-
pliance rate depends on the relationship between the firm-specific parameters αi and δi. In principle,
there are two kinds of firms, each with distinct parameters: those whose shares are publicly listed on
stock exchanges (“listed”) and those whose shares are privately held (“private”). The coefficient αi
is different for these two types of firms for several reasons; among them are liquidity premiums and
ease of access to finance. All other things being equal, private firms’ cost of capital is higher than
that of listed firms because their shares are not traded in organized and liquid markets. Therefore,
these types of securities cannot be traded easily, and investors demand a premium.19 As a result,
private firms are subject to a liquidity premium, and the parameter αi should be higher for publicly
listed firms, all other things being equal.
The second coefficient of interests is δi, the strictness of the regulator monitoring the firm, which
affects the probability pi of being caught bypassing regulations. This coefficient is also different for
listed firms than for private ones, and can differ significantly for at least two reasons. First, listed
firms are subject to stricter scrutiny because they are overseen by a larger number of agencies than
private firms.20 Second, their statements are publicly available and therefore they are subject to ad-
ditional scrutiny by analysts, shareholders, and competitors. Therefore, the conditional probability
of being caught bypassing regulations is higher for listed firms than for private firms.
Since both α and δ are higher for listed firms than for private firms, the relationship between




priori undetermined, and is tested in Section 1.2. However, my result makes it clear that optimal
compliance rates increase with the level of EF , since the cost of compliance gets lower and the cost
of non-compliance remains unchanged. In addition, the relation between optimal compliance rates
for listed and private firms does not change for different levels of EF . If listed firms comply more
than private ones, they do it at every level of EF .
19Several papers try to estimate the discount at which non-liquid shares trade, with respect to
liquid shares. For instance, Longstaff, 1995 provides an analytical framework and estimates that the
discount can be high, even for short terms of non-marketability. This conclusion is consistent with
empirical findings in Silber, 1991, that estimate the discount to be about 34%.
20Agencies such as the SEC monitor listed firms only.
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After showing that listed firms comply more than private ones, the model draws interesting
predictions. Figure C1 shows optimal compliance rates for different levels of EF with the following
parameters: αlisted = 1, αprivate = 0.9, δlisted = 1, δprivate = 0.5, and γ = 1.21 Figure C2 graphs
the value of listed and private firms under their optimal compliance rates and for different levels of
EF .22 Interestingly, we find that in business-unfriendly markets —with levels of EF below or equal
to 0.45— the same firm is more valuable for a private owner than for a listed one. However, in less
business-unfriendly environments —with levels of EF above 0.45— the firm is more valuable for a
listed owner than for a private one. Consequently, when markets become less business-unfriendly,
we might expect listed firms to acquire private firms, because V (listed) > V (private). In contrast,
when markets become more business-unfriendly, we might expect private firms to acquire listed firms,
because V (private) > V (listed). I test this prediction in Section 2.2 and find evidence consistent
with my prediction.
21This parametrization reflects the relative results found in Section 1.2.
22The value obtained from the model is multiplied by 100 for clarity.
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Figure C1: Comparative Statistics: Optimal Compliance Rates Under Different Lev-
els of EF
This Figure shows how the optimal compliance rate for listed and private firms varies
with changes in the level of EF . The graph reflects the trade-off firms face between
compliance and non-compliance costs, and shows that differences in the strictness of
the auditing and enforcement standards and in the cost of capital between listed and
private firms affect the optimal compliance rate.
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Figure C2: Comparative Statistics: Value of Firms Under Different Levels of EF
This Figure shows how the value of listed and private firms varies with changes in
the level of EF . At low levels of EF (i.e. more business-unfriendly markets), the
firm value is higher for a private owner than for a listed owner. In contrast, at higher
levels of EF (i.e. more business-friendly markets) the relationship is reversed and
the firm value is higher for a listed owner than for a private owner.
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